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Offer price range in Finnish initial public offerings
Objective of the study
The purpose of the study is to analyse the determinants of the width and the level of the initial offer 
price range in the Finnish IPOs. The determinants analysed are market conditions and firm and 
offering specific characteristics that are generally associated with uncertainty. The other objective is 
to investigate the efficiency of the IPO pricing process during the first stages of the IPO, which is 
done by analysing whether underwriters incorporate all information available to them to the initial 
offer price range and the final offer price, and by observing how accurately the initial offer price 
range predicts the final offer price and the market price of the share after the IPO. As there is no 
guidance in Finland regarding the width of the range, analysing the determinants of the range is 
more meaningful than in the earlier studies in the US, where the range width is based on SEC 
recommendations. The study also tests partial adjustment phenomenon in the Finnish IPO market 
with recent data.
Data and methodology
A sample of 45 Finnish IPOs between January 1, 1995 and December 31, 2006 where an initial 
offer price range is announced is used to study the subject statistically. The statistics relating to the 
width and the level of the offer price range in the sample IPOs are analysed to describe the 
characteristics of the ranges in Finland. Ordinary least squares linear regression analysis is 
conducted to test the impact of certain firm and offering specific characteristics and market 
conditions on the width of the offer price range, the price adjustment from the range midpoint to the 
final offer price, and initial returns. Information about the offerings has been collected mainly from 
prospectuses of the listed companies.
Results
There is no standard width of the offer price range in Finland, but the width varies significantly. 
The average percentage width of the range in the sample is 16.7%. In 89% of the sample IPOs, the 
final offer price remains within the offer price range, and it is set at the high value of the range in 
40% of the IPOs. This finding indicates that the issuing firm commits to some extent to set the price 
within the range limits. Firm and offering specific factors or pre-IPO market conditions do not 
predict the width of the range very well, but they have some power in explaining the adjustment in 
the final offer price from the range midpoint. The midpoint of the range is a relatively accurate 
estimation of the final offer price and the first-day closing price, as the midpoint differs on average 
9.4% from the final offer price and 19.3% from the first-day closing price. Underwriters do not 
incorporate all the infonnation available to them to the final offer price, as price adjustments are 
positively related to initial returns, which implies that the partial adjustment phenomenon exists also 
in the Finnish IPO market.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Offer price range in IPO pricing process
Pricing of initial public offerings has been a popular topic in the financial research during the 
past two decades. IPO pricing has proven to be difficult, as there is no earlier reference point 
that would indicate the market value of the company going public. Issuing firm’s management 
does not know exactly what price the investors would be willing to pay for the shares in the 
offering even though the management has their perception of the correct share price. There 
are numerous studies and theories explaining underpricing of IPOs, but the first stage of the 
IPO pricing process, namely the setting of the initial offer price range, has received less 
attention in the earlier literature.
In the beginning of the IPO pricing process the issuing firm and the underwriters decide the 
initial offer price range that reflects the expected price for the offering and that is set out in 
the prospectus. The final offer price is usually decided after the book building process, where 
indications of interest are obtained from institutional investors. The final offer price is usually 
announced to the market in a stock exchange release shortly before the IPO occurs.
There are two aspects of the initial offer price range that the underwriter and the issuing firm 
have to decide. First, they have to decide the level (i.e. the midpoint) of the offer price range, 
which signals the price level that the issuer expects the investors to be willing to pay for 
shares in the issue. Furthermore, they have to decide the width of the offer price range, which 
determines how far from each other the high and low values of the range are.
In a recent Finnish IPO process that received a lot of attention the design company Iittala 
Group was about to go public during spring 2007. The initial offer price range was € 8.50 to € 
10.50. The final offer price was set to € 9.50, but the listing was cancelled due to lack of 
investor interest. According to Iittala’s CEO, the offering would have been easily 
oversubscribed if the offer price would have been set to € 9.00, which would still have been 
within the initial range and above the minimum price of the range, but the main shareholder 
insisted on a higher price. During the same week the health care company Suomen 
Terveystalo announced that the final offer price in their IPO is € 2.40, which was exactly at
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the lower bound of the initial offer price range of € 2.40 - € 3.00. The unexpected turn in the 
Iittala IPO process raised the question why the initial offer price range in the Iittala IPO was 
set in the first place to a level that was not satisfactory to the main shareholder, and what is 
eventually the role of the initial range in the IPO procedure.
This paper analyses the determinants of the width and the level of the initial offer price range 
in Finnish initial public offerings.
1.2 Research question and objective of the study
The research question of this study is:
What are the determinants of the width and the level of the initial offer price 
range in Finnish IPOs?
The objectives of this study are the following:
1) To analyse the determinants of the width and the level of the initial offer price range in 
the Finnish IPO market. The determinants analysed are market conditions and Finn 
and offering specific characteristics that are generally associated with uncertainty 
regarding the IPO value.
2) To analyse the efficiency of the IPO pricing process during the first stages of the IPO, 
which is done by testing whether underwriters incorporate all information available to 
them to the initial offer price range and the final offer price, and by observing how 
accurately the initial offer price range predicts the final offer price and the market 
price of the share after the IPO.
In this study it is assumed that both the width and the level of the initial offer price range are 
affected by factors indicating uncertainty relating to IPO values. Risky offerings are assumed 
to have wide ranges and large adjustments between the final offer price and the midpoint of 
the range, and vice versa.
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1.3 Earlier studies
Even though there are several studies that have in some context discussed the initial offer 
price range, there are not that many focusing on it. The width of the range has been associated 
with and used as a proxy for the uncertainty regarding the IPO value in earlier studies (see 
e.g. Hanley, 1993 and Benveniste and Wilhelm, 1997). Hanley (1993) discovered that the 
wider the range, the greater is the change in the final offer price from the midpoint of the offer 
price range. Daily et al. (2005) studied with a sample of US IPOs the impact of several firm 
and offering characteristics that are generally associated with uncertainty regarding the IPO 
value on the width of the offer price range, but found no satisfactory evidence of the assumed 
relation. Jenkinson et al. (2006) noted that the guidance by Securities Exchange Commission 
(SEC) regarding the range widths has lead to a clustering of range widths in the US, so the 
width of the offer price range is determined by convention rather than the uncertainty 
regarding the value of the IPO. This trend can explain the shortage of results obtained in the 
study by Daily et al. (2005). As there is no guidance in Finland regarding the width of the 
range, analysing the effect of the firm and offering specific factors on the range width in the 
Finnish context is meaningful and more likely to generate positive results than a respective 
analysis with data from the US.
The level of the range can be evaluated by comparing the midpoint of the range to the final 
offer price or to the price observed in the market. The revisions in the offer price with respect 
to the midpoint of the offer price range have been shown to be related to underpricing (see 
e.g. Hanley, 1993; Loughran and Ritter, 2002). Offerings where the offer price exceeds the 
high value of the initial offer price range incur higher initial returns. It indicates that the 
positive information learned after setting of the initial offer price range is not fully 
incorporated to the final offer price, which results in a higher level of underpricing. The 
phenomenon is generally referred to as partial adjustment. This thesis tests with recent 
Finnish data whether partial adjustment can be identified also in Finland.
There are many theories explaining the partial adjustment phenomenon. Benveniste and 
Spindt (1989) presented a dynamic information acquisition theory according to which the 
offer prices must be set low to reward the investors for revealing positive private information 
about the market demand during the book building process. Loughran and Ritter (2002) found 
that there is partial adjustment also to public information. They proposed a prospect theory
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explanation to the partial adjustment, which is based on the assumption that issuers care about 
the change in their wealth rather than the level of wealth. Owners do not mind leaving money 
on the table as much when the post-market valuation of the company and thus their wealth 
after the IPO is higher than they expected.
Lowry and Schwert (2004) found that underwriters do not incorporate all market infonnation 
available to the initial offer price range either, as price revisions from the range midpoint to 
the final offer price were found to be related to market returns prior to setting the offer price 
range. They also noted that firm and offering specific characteristics can explain price 
adjustment in a similar way than they predict underpricing. The findings and conclusions by 
Lowry and Schwert regarding the efficiency of the IPO pricing are tested with a more 
comprehensive set of predicting variables.
In addition, many of the studies and theories that explain underpricing, long-run performance 
or long term survival of IPO companies and that assume information asymmetry between the 
issuer and the investors are relevant also in the context of this study. The theories tested in 
this study include also for example venture capitalist certification theory (see e.g. Megginson 
and Weiss, 1991) and signalling theory (see e.g. Leland and Руке, 1977).
1.4 Motives for the study
Given that setting the initial offer price range is the first stage of IPO pricing process, it is 
surprising that it has not gained more attention in academic literature. As the initial offer price 
range is not a binding indication of the price at which the shares are offered to investors, it has 
perhaps been considered as a less important stage in the IPO pricing. However, as noted by 
Jenkinson et al. (2006), the limits of the range are rarely exceeded in European IPOs, which 
indicates that the range has an impact on the final offer price and thus also on the initial 
returns for the investors. Therefore, both the level and the width of the initial offer price range 
have relevance in IPO pricing and hence, it is important to understand how the range is 
determined.
The IPO pricing related research has mostly focused on the difference between the final offer 
price and the market price observed after the IPO has occurred. There are no studies that
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would have succeeded in explaining the determinants of the width of the range. A few 
researchers have studied the level of the range, but they have concentrated more on the 
relation between the adjustment in the offer price from the initial price range midpoint to the 
final offer price rather than the reasons for the price adjustment. This study aims at increasing 
the understanding of the determinants of the initial offer price range.
There is not very much recent research on the Finnish IPO market, which is partly due to the 
small size of the market. As book building process replaced to a large extent fixed price 
offerings in Finland only in the 1990s, research analysing the offer price range or partial 
adjustment hypothesis is still limited. Therefore, this study contributes to the IPO related 
research also by presenting new findings about the IPO pricing process and the offer price 
range in Finland.
1.5 Data and scope of the study
To study the subject statistically, a sample of 45 Finnish IPOs between January 1, 1995 and 
December 31, 2006 is used. Only IPOs where an initial offer price range is announced are 
included in the sample. The statistics describing the width and the level of the offer price 
range in the sample IPOs are analysed to provide information about the characteristics of the 
ranges in the Finnish market. The impact of certain firm and offering specific characteristics 
and market conditions on the width of the offer price range, the price adjustment from the 
range midpoint to the final offer price, and initial returns is tested with the ordinary least 
squares linear regression analysis. Information about the firms and the offerings has been 
mainly collected from prospectuses of the listed companies.
As this paper is about the initial offer price range, underpricing of IPOs is discussed only to 
the extent it serves the main purpose of this study, and only such underpricing related theories 
that are considered most relevant in this context are presented. As the study focuses on the 
Finnish market, only Finnish IPOs are included in the study. The time frame is limited to 12 
years due to the availability and quality of data.
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1.6 Structure of the paper
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The second section discusses briefly the stages 
and the institutional aspects of the IPO pricing process in Finland and the role of the initial 
offer price range in the procedure. The third section presents a short literature review and 
discusses some of the IPO pricing related theories that could have relevance in explaining the 
determinants of the offer price range. In the fourth section the data and the chosen 
methodology are described, and hypotheses are developed on the basis of the research 
question. The fifth section presents the results of the analysis, and finally the last section 
concludes and suggests ideas for further research.
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2 Pricing of initial public offerings
2.1 Challenges with IPO pricing
The decision to go public is an important step in the life cycle of a firm. Stock exchange 
listing serves for two main purposes: it allows the company to raise equity financing from the 
market, and enables public trading of the firm shares (Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 1996). There 
are several other benefits and motivations to go public. In a recent study by Brau and Fawcett 
(2006), the most important reason for CFOs’ stock exchange listing decisions was shown to 
be facilitation of acquisitions.
The pricing of initial public offerings have proven to be difficult. The value of shares in IPOs 
is difficult to evaluate, as there is no past analyst research and no market prices that could be 
observed, and because many of the issuing firms have little operating history (Ibbotson et. al, 
1994; Sherman, 2005). The shareholders and the management of the company have 
informational advantage towards investors due to their clearly better knowledge of the 
company’s past performance, current financial standing and future prospects.
The management acts in the interest of the original shareholders whose interest is to achieve 
as high a price for the issue as possible to maximise their wealth. The investors who are 
interested in purchasing or subscribing shares in the offering naturally want to pay as low a 
price as possible. The arranger of the offering has to find the right balance between the 
conflicting interests and the supply and the demand to be able to arrange a successful IPO. If 
the price is set too low, the issuing firm does not get the full benefit from its ability to raise 
capital and the wealth of the firm is transferred to new investors. If the offering is priced too 
high, the investors are likely to reject the issue. Sometimes the market is not willing to pay the 
minimum price required by the issuer, and the IPO has to be cancelled.
2.2 IPO pricing process
Figure 1 shows a simple IPO pricing process timeline that is based on the figure presented by 
Lowry and Schwert (2004). The first stage of the pricing process occurs when the issuing firm 
together with the underwriters decide the initial offer price range that indicates what they
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expect the final offer price to be. The initial offer price range is set out in the prospectus 
published by the issuer. After the book building process where indications of interest are 
gathered from investors, the issuer and underwriters set the final offer price, which is the price 
at which the shares are offered to the investors. The final offer price is disclosed shortly 
before the IPO occurs and the public trading with the company’s shares begins. When the 
final offer price is set, one can observe the percentage change between the midpoint of the 
initial offer price range and the final offer price that Lowry and Schwert refer to as the price 
update.1




Initial offer price 
range isset
Final offer price is set 
and IPO occurs
Post-IPO price is 
observed in tlte market
Figure 1 IPO pricing process timeline
The figure presents a simple timeline for IPO process. The timeline has been adapted from a figure presented by 
Lowry and Schwert (2004).
Finally, when the public trading with the firm’s shares has begun, the market price for the 
shares can be observed. The relation between the final offer price and the market price shortly 
after the listing is interesting, as it signals whether the issue was priced at a correct level in 
relation to the market demand. The possible underpricing of IPOs can be identified by 
calculating the initial returns for investors, which are measured as the difference of the post­
market price that can be observed in the secondary market (generally the first-day closing
1 The terminology used varies with respect to the percentage change between the midpoint of the offer price 
range and the final offer price. Lowry and Schwert (2004) call it price update, whereas e.g. Jenkinson et. al 
(2006) refer to it as price adjustment and Hanley (1993) simply as change in the offer price.
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price) and the final offer price paid by the investors (see e.g. Ritter and Welch, 2002). The 
phases of the pricing process in Finland are presented more in detail below.2
2.2.1 Prospectus and indicative offer price range
Before the company can officially start marketing its initial public offering, it has to file a 
prospectus. The purpose of the prospectus is to market the offering to potential investors and 
give them sufficient information about the firm and the offering so that they are able to make 
their investment decision. The prospectus may be published only after it has been approved 
by the Financial Supervision (Rahoitustarkastus), which is the authority supervising the 
Finnish financial market. There is no preliminary prospectus in the Finnish IPO process as for 
example in the IPOs in the US (see e.g. Jenkinson et al., 2006).
The information content of the prospectus is highly regulated to protect the investors. The 
legal framework regarding Finnish securities market and the listing procedure consists of 
many regulatory sources.3 The detailed requirements for the contents of the prospectus are 
regulated mainly by European Commission Regulation (EC) No 809/2004.
According to the EC regulation 809/2004, the prospectus must disclose the terms and 
conditions of the offer, including an indication of the price at which the securities will be 
offered. If the price is not known, the prospectus has to indicate the method for determining 
the offer price, including a statement as to who has set the criteria or is formally responsible
2 The institutional aspects in the description of phases of the Finnish IPO process are based on an interview with 
Mr. Ville Kajala, Market Supervisor, Financial Supervision, on 10th of January, 2007.
3 The applicable regulations for the listing procedure and the prospectus in Finland include at least the following: 
The Finnish Securities Act, European Commissions Regulation (EC) No 809/2004, Ministry of Finance Decrees 
452/2005 and 538/2005, CESR's recommendations for the consistent implementation of the European 
Commissions Regulation on Prospectuses no 809/2004, and Financial Supervision Authority Interpretation 
3/2005. In addition, the standards of FSA guide the listing process, and also Helsinki Stock Exchange has certain 
rules and requirements relating to the procedure.
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for the determination. Furthermore, the process for the disclosure of the offer price has to be 
described (see EC Regulation 809/2004, Annex III, Section 5.3.1. Minimum Disclosure 
Requirements for the Share Securities Note).
The regulation does not contain very explicit instructions about the disclosure of the 
anticipated offer price range. In practice, an indicative offer price range with a maximum and 
minimum price is disclosed in the prospectus if the offer is not a fixed price offer. The initial 
range is based on underwriter’s analysis of the market value of the issuing firm and is decided 
by the underwriter and the issuer. To meet the legal requirements for the pricing information, 
prospectus usually includes a statement describing the initial range and the procedure for 
setting the final offer price. For example the IPO prospectus of Ahlström Oyj in 2006 
included the following statement4:
“The Offer Price will be determined through a book building process in which 
the Company decides the final Offer Price on the basis of the price indications 
given by institutional investors during the marketing of the Offering. The Initial 
Offer Price Range is 20.00 - 24.00 euros per Offer Share. The final Offer Price 
will be decided and communicated through a stock exchange release around 
13,h March 2006. The final Offer Price of the Offer Shares may be above or 
below the Initial Offer Price Range. The Offer Price is the same for all investors 
participating in the Offering. ”
The underwriter may pre-market the issue and exchange information regarding the pricing 
and the interest in the offering with institutional investors already before the prospectus has 
been published. The additional information obtained from investors may be helpful for the 
underwriter and the issuer in setting the initial offer range at an appropriate level and in some 
cases in even deciding whether the timing is right for the IPO. Jenkinson et al. (2006) 
described the institutional setting of the IPO process in the US and Europe and noted that 
information exchange between the arranger and investors before the IPO filing period has 
officially began is less restricted in Europe than in the US.
4 Free translation from the Finnish IPO prospectus of Ahlström Oyj dated 24 February 2006.
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2.2.2 Bookbuilding
The next stage of IPO pricing is to market the offering to investors in a road show conducted 
by the management and the underwriters. The underwriters conduct a book building process, 
during which institutional investors are asked for indications of interest at different price 
levels. The final offer price is decided on the basis of the book building and depends on the 
positive and negative signals received from investors about their willingness to participate in 
the offering.
Book building has been used in the US IPOs for a long time and has largely replaced fixed 
price offerings also in Europe (see e.g. Ljungqvist et al., 2003; Ritter, 2003). The same 
development has occurred in the Finnish IPO market. The Finnish principles regarding the 
allocation of shares differ from the US practice. In Finland the arranger has to treat the 
investors impartially and cannot therefore decide the allocation of shares free from 
restrictions.5 The allocation principles regarding the offering have to be published in the 
prospectus. Sherman (2000) categorised the process used in Finland as the open offer method 
due to the restrictions in the allocation of shares.
2.2.3 Setting of final offer price
Based on the indications of interest and possibly other relevant information received during 
the book building, the underwriters and the firm management decide the final offer price. If 
the demand for the issue is higher than expected, the final offer price may be set above the 
expected price, i.e. the midpoint of the indicative range. Alternatively, if the demand is lower 
than expected, the final offer price will be below the expected price. Formally this means that 
the issuer completes the prospectus, as the prospectus that was earlier published did not set 
out the exact price at which the shares are offered to investors, but only an indicative range
5 The Securities Market Act 2:1 provides that “securities shall not be marketed or acquired in business by giving 
false or misleading information or by using procedure that is contrary to good practice or otherwise unfair". 
The Financial Supervision has specified in Standard 5.2a that this means that the arranger has to treat investors 
impartially.
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and the method how the final offer price will be determined. In practice, the completion is 
done through a stock exchange release prior to the listing date whereby the final offer price is 
announced. No new version of the prospectus is published, but the release is considered as a 
part of the prospectus and a copy of the release is just added in between the prospectus. The 
completion of the prospectus does not need to be separately approved by the Financial 





Low Ranjs nidpoint High
Final offer price
Figure 2 Offer price range and final offer price
Figure 2 presents the relation between the initial offer price range and the final offer price. 
The initial offer price range is not binding. The final offer price is often within the initial 
range (as in Figure 2), but it may also exceed the upper or lower limit. If the final offer price 
exceeds the upper or lower bound of the range, it is no longer considered as a completion of 
the prospectus information, but a change in the terms of the offering. This has at least two 
immediate implications. Firstly, the Financial Supervision has to approve the change in the 
terms. Secondly, the investors have an option to cancel their participation in the offering 
within two banking days of the change.6
Also the initial offer price range can be amended before the IPO. If the issuing firm finds out 
during the book building that the interest in the offering differs significantly from what the
6 The cancellation right of the investors derives from the directive 2003/71/EY, which has been implemented in 
the Finnish Securities Market Act 2:3c.
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issuer had expected, it may be reasonable to revise the offer price range instead of just setting 
the final offer price outside the range. The revision of the offer price range is again a change 
in the terms of the offering, so the change has to be approved by the Financial Supervision 
and the investors are allowed to cancel their share subscription. However, in this case the two 
days’ cancellation option will elapse already during the subscription period. Provided that the 
final offer price remains within the amended range, the investors who have not used their 
cancellation right during the subscription period have no longer the right to cancel their 
subscriptions when the final offer price is decided. Therefore, by amending the initial offer 
price range the company can avoid waiting two days after they have set the final offer price 
before they know whether any investors will cancel their participation in the offering. The 
price range amendment is done in practice by means of a stock exchange release after the 
Financial Supervision has approved the amendment.
2.3 Determinants of initial offer price range
2.3.1 Purpose of offer price range
The first stage of IPO pricing is to decide the initial offer price range that is set out in the 
prospectus. The purpose of the range is to communicate to investors a range within which the 
issuer expects the final offer price to be set. It provides a first benchmark for investors when 
they consider participating in the offering. The significance of the initial price range is 
reduced by the fact that the range can be amended and that the final offer price can be set 
outside the range. Even though the initial offer price range is not a binding commitment to 
offer the shares in the IPO at a particular price, it is still an important stage of IPO pricing, as 
especially in European IPOs the limits of the range are rarely exceeded.
In addition to the level of the range that signals the approximate value that the issuer expects 
the investors to be willing to pay for one share in the issue, the arranger and the issuing firm 
have to decide the width of the offer price range. The width of the offer price range means 
how far from each other the high and low values of the range are. There are no regulations or 
recommendations by the Financial Supervision or other authorities regarding the width of the 
range in Finland, whereas the US Securities Exchanged Commission (SEC) has given
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guidance on the appropriate range width in the US IPO market (see e.g. Jenkinson et al., 
2006).
What then determines the level and the width of the offer price range? The issuing firm and 
the underwriter have to utilise the information available to them when setting the initial range. 
Secondly, the interests of the parties involved are likely to affect the range.
2.3.2 Information available to issuing company and arranger
The issuing firm and the underwriter have to set the indicative offer price range on the basis 
of the information available to them when setting the range. First, issuing firms and 
underwriters are likely to base the offer price range on firm and offering specific 
characteristics that can be observed in the prospectus (see e.g. Daily et al., 2005). Company 
characteristics that are expected to be relevant in setting a price for an IPO include for 
example factors relating to share ownership, financial standing, past financial performance, 
industry and company age. Typical factors relating to the offering that may impact IPO 
pricing comprise timing, reason and size for the offering as well as parties involved in the 
IPO. These kind of finn and offering specific characteristics affect the investors’ willingness 
to subscribe shares at a certain price and therefore are expected to have impact on the setting 
of the initial offer price range.7
Secondly, market conditions are likely to affect the IPO pricing (see e.g. Ibbotson and Jaffe, 
1975). Underwriters and issuer firms gather information about investors’ appetite to IPOs in 
general and about the status and prospects of the stock market to find out whether the timing 
is appropriate for an IPO and whether the market is receptive for IPOs.
7 Obviously the generally applied stock valuation methods capture many of the factors mentioned here. Such 
methods are not described in detail in this study (for more information see e.g. Kim and Ritter, 1999).
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2.3.3 Interests of involved parties
There are several parties involved in the IPO process with differing interests. Investors are 
hoping for high returns for the shares that they subscribe in the IPO, the management of the 
issuer company is focusing on the long-run performance of the firm, the original shareholders 
want the best possible compensation for their exit if they are selling their shares or for the 
dilution of the company’s wealth if they are holding their shares, and the investment bankers 
are keen on keeping their reputation and maximising their fees.
Interests of the parties involved in the IPO are likely to affect the width of the range. It is in 
the interest of both the issuing firm and the underwriter to set an accurate and realistic offer 
price range to be able to credibly signal their estimation of the market value of the firm. The 
credibility pressure pushes the issuer and the underwriter towards a relatively narrow offer 
price range.
A very wide range would signal to the market that the arranger is very uncertain about the 
true value of the firm and the market demand for its shares. The arranger has its reputation on 
stake and therefore does not want to give such a signal. Also, the investment bankers do not 
want the offer price to be too far outside the estimated range, as it might question their 
expertise. An exceptionally wide range could also signal that the original shareholders are 
willing to cash out their shareholdings for almost any price. Narrower range indicates to the 
market that the management is confident in their estimations about the market value of the 
firm and gives a positive signal about the capability of the management.
On the other hand, if the offer price range is too narrow, it leaves less flexibility for the issuer 
to adjust the final offer price without providing investors a chance to withdraw from the 
offering after their subscriptions. If the final offer price is outside the initial offer price range, 
the investors have the possibility to cancel their subscriptions during two days. It has been 
suggested in earlier literature that underwriters and issuers who are uncertain of the issue 
price are likely to set wider offer price ranges to allow for greater flexibility in setting the 
final offer price (Hanley, 1993).
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Range width can also depend on how the market reacts to an offer price that is outside the 
range and how common it is in the market in question. Jenkinson et al. (2006) found that the 
limits of the range are exceeded much more often in the US than in European IPOs. In 
Germany it has even been suggested that investment banks have been hesitant to exceed the 
initial range due to the risk of investor legal action (Jenkinson et. al, 2006).
Differing interests can affect also the level of the initial offer price range. A company may 
consider it very important that their IPO succeeds, and is therefore willing to set the range to a 
low level to make sure that there is enough interest in the offering. A successful IPO and a 
high final offer price in relation to the expected price may give a positive signal to the market 
about the firm. It is also possible that investment banks are careful in their estimations of the 
price that can be obtained from the market, as a higher final offer price leaves a good taste in 
the original shareholders’ mouths (see Loughran and Ritter, 2002) and enables the investment 
banks to justify their high fees.
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3 Earlier research
IPO pricing has been a popular topic within the finance related research. However, research 
has focused to a large extent on later stages of IPO pricing, and there are only a few studies 
relating to initial offer price range, which can be considered the first stage of the IPO pricing 
process.
3.1 Studies on initial offer price range
Jenkinson et al. (2006) paid attention to that European IPOs are very rarely priced outside the 
initial offer price range. In their sample of 740 European and 2,930 US IPOs between January 
1994 and July 1999, half of the US IPOs were priced outside the indicative price range, 
whereas only in one-tenth of European IPOs the final offer price exceeded the bounds of the 
initial range. Furthermore, the final offer price was set at the higher bound of the range in 
almost 47% of the European IPOs.
The unresponsiveness of European initial price ranges to the demand as revealed during book 
building is according to Jenkinson et al. not a symptom of inefficiency, but can be explained 
with differences in the book building process. In Europe, the issuer and investors are able to 
exchange information regarding the pricing and the demand for the offering already before the 
initial offer price range is set, and issuer’s unofficial commitment to stay within the range is 
needed to obtain private information from investors. In the US, the information exchange 
before the preliminary prospectus is filed is very restricted. As a result of the information 
exchange prior to setting the initial offer price range, the ranges are more accurate in Europe 
than in the US. Jenkinson et al. found that the midpoint of the range was on average seven 
percent closer to the first week closing price in Europe than in the US. Furthermore, average 
underpricing was no higher in Europe than in the US despite of the fact that the initial offer 
price range was exceeded less frequently, which supports the proposition by Jenkinson et al.
As the underwriters do not have as much information available in the US as in Europe when 
setting the initial offer price range, it could be anticipated that the range is wider in the US 
than in Europe. However, the average width of the initial offer price range was approximately 
15% in the US and 16% in Europe in the IPO sample of Jenkinson et al. This appears to be
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caused by the fact that the width of the initial price range tends to be based on SEC guidance 
in the US and governed by convention rather than the uncertainty relating to the value of the 
IPO. Until September 2001, the SEC guidance recommended a price range not wider than 
greater of $2 or 10% of the lower price, and thereafter $2 or 20% of the lower price. This has 
resulted in a tendency to set a price range of exactly two dollars (see also Ritter, 2003). In 
contrast, Jenkinson et al. found no evidence on any clustering of range widths in Europe.
Daily et al. (2005) tried in their study to identify firm and offering specific factors that affect 
the IPO offer price range and the offer price. Daily et al. gathered from prospectuses of 192 
IPOs in the US the following characteristics that are generally considered to be associated 
with uncertainty regarding the IPO value: are CEOs founders of the firm, CEO-retained 
equity, board size and composition, board prestige, involvement of venture capitalists, firm 
size and age, and pre-IPO profitability. The factors were assumed to signal the firm value to 
investment bankers when they determine the offer price range and the offer price of the IPO. 
However, Daily et al. found no evidence of the assumed relation of the chosen factors to the 
width of the offer price range.
3.2 IPO underpricing theories
Underpricing of IPOs is a generally and universally identified phenomenon in the stock 
market. Underpricing, generally also referred to as first-day returns or initial returns, is 
commonly measured as the difference between the final offer price and the first-day closing 
price (see e.g. Ritter and Welch, 2002). Ritter and Welch documented an average initial return 
of 18.8 percent in their sample of 6,249 IPOs in the US between 1980 and 2001. Keloharju 
(1993) analysed the Finnish IPO market with a sample of 80 IPOs between years 1984 and 
1989 and found an average initial return of 8.7%.
When an issue is underpriced, investors buy the shares at discount and a part of the wealth of 
the original shareholders is transferred to the new owners (see e.g. Loughran and Ritter, 
2002). There are several possible explanations for why issuers leave money on the table in 
IPOs, most of which are based on the assumption of information asymmetry between the
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parties involved in the IPO process. In addition, there are many recent theories based on the 
allocation and trading of IPO shares.8 However, as allocation and trading are activities that 
take place only after the initial offer price range has been decided, these theories are likely to 
have only limited relevance in determining the range. Therefore, theories based on asymmetry 
of information are assumed to be the most relevant theories in studying the factors affecting 
the width of the initial price range and the revisions of the offer price. The basic concepts of 
theories that are considered to have potential in explaining the relation between the width of 
the offer range, the final offer price and underpricing are summarised below.
3.3 Uncertainty regarding IPO value and winner’s curse
Beatty and Ritter (1986) demonstrated already two decades ago that the uncertainty of 
investors regarding the value of the IPO is related to the underpricing of the offering. The 
greater is the ex ante uncertainty regarding the value of the issue, the greater is the expected 
underpricing.
The theoretical basis of their study was the theory on winner’s curse developed by Rock 
(1986). According to the winner’s curse theory, some of the investors possess more 
information than others, which helps the investors with superior information to choose to 
participate in the good IPOs and stay away from the bad ones. When too many investors want 
to participate in an offering, the investors get rationed. An investor would receive full 
allocation in overpriced IPOs but only a partial allocation in underpriced IPOs. Many 
investors are afraid that they will only receive full allocations of IPO shares if they are among 
the most optimistic investors. Therefore, IPOs have to be underpriced on average to attract 
investors to participate in initial public offerings.
8 See e.g. Ritter and Welch (2002) and Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (1996) for classification of underpricing 
theories on the basis of their basic assumptions.
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3.4 Partial adjustment phenomenon
Benveniste and Spindt (1989) studied the IPO book building process and proposed that IPO 
pricing is a dynamic information acquisition process: IPO offer prices must be set low to 
provide profit to compensate investors for revealing positive information during the book 
building. This dynamic information acquisition hypothesis suggests that the final offer price 
only partially reflects the positive information acquired by the underwriters during the book 
building process. As the final offer price does not fully incorporate the positive information, 
the initial returns for investors are higher. Benveniste and Spindt predicted that firms that 
have greater uncertainty regarding the value of the shares to be issued are more likely to have 
their offer price revised.
Hanley (1993) studied the partial adjustment phenomenon and particularly the relation 
between the initial offer price range, final offer price and underpricing with a sample of 1,430 
IPOs between January 1983 and September 1987 in the US. She documented that the change 
in the offer price from the midpoint of the initial price offer range is a good predictor of 
underpricing. She divided the IPO sample into three categories based on whether the final 
offer price is above the initial offer price range, within the range or below the range. Share 
issues that had final offer prices exceeding the higher bound of the range had higher initial 
returns. She found average initial returns of 20.7% for issues exceeding the higher bound, 
whereas the average initial returns for issues within the anticipated range were 10.0%. Results 
evidencing the same pattem have later been documented by other researchers (see e.g. 
Loughran and Ritter, 2002). According to Hanley, her findings were consistent with the 
prediction of Benveniste and Spindt (1989) stating that positive infonnation gathered by 
underwriters from potential investors during book building is only partially reflected in the 
final offer price.
Furthermore, Hanley studied the determinants of adjustments in the final offer price in 
relation to the expected offer price, i.e. the range midpoint. She analysed several factors that 
she anticipated to be related to price adjustments, including uncertainty relating to the true 
value of the issue. She proxied uncertainty regarding the IPO value with the percentage width 
of offer price range, and found that the offer price revision is positively related to the width of 
the offer price range. The wider the range, the greater the uncertainty regarding the IPO value 
and the greater the absolute change in the final offer price relative to the range midpoint.
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3.5 Partial adjustment to public information
The model developed by Benveniste and Spindt predicts a partial adjustment with respect to 
private information, as investors have to be rewarded to truthfully reveal their demand for the 
issue. The model assumes that public information is incorporated into the offer price.
However, several academics have found positive relation between initial returns and changes 
in the market index between the initial offer price setting and the decision on the final offer 
price (see e.g. Loughran and Ritter, 2002; Lowry and Schwert, 2002 and 2004). Changes in 
the market conditions are public information, so the finding contradicts the Benveniste and 
Spindt hypothesis.
Lowry and Schwert (2004) studied how underwriters treat public information during the IPO 
pricing process. They analysed whether public information is fully incorporated to the initial 
price range and the final offer price. Lowry and Schwert focused on analysing the percentage 
difference between the midpoint of the initial price range and the final offer price, the price 
update. They found that certain firm and offering specific characteristics, such as underwriter 
prestige, industry and offering size, are able to explain the price update in a similar way than 
they explain underpricing. Market returns before setting the initial range were also found to 
be positively related to the price update. The ability of firm and offering specific factors to 
explain underpricing has been generally interpreted as supporting information asymmetry 
hypothesis. According to Lowry and Schwert, the ability of such variables to predict also 
price update signals that public information is not fully incorporated to the initial offer price 
range.
Furthermore, market returns during the filing process, i.e. after the initial offer price range is 
set but before the final price is decided, were shown to be positively related to the price 
update. However, the low economical significance of their finding suggests that almost all 
public information is incorporated to the final offer price. In this respect their results differed 
from the study by Loughran and Ritter (2002).
Wu (2005) examined the relation between price adjustment, initial returns and subsequent 
short-run performance with a sample of IPOs from 1986 to 1996 in the US, and found that
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offer price adjustment predicts not only initial returns but also subsequent short-run 
performance. Bradley and Jordan (2002) studied the partial adjustment by analysing 
amendments of the offer price range and documented that file range amendments are 
significantly related to IPO underpricing.
There are several explanations for the partial adjustment to public information. The prospect 
theory explanation of partial adjustment phenomenon presented by Loughran and Ritter 
(2002) is based on the assumption that issuers care about the change in their wealth rather 
than the level of wealth. Owners do not mind leaving money on the table as much when the 
post-market valuation of the company and thus their wealth after the IPO turns out to be 
higher than they expected. Therefore they do not care about the underpricing of the IPO if the 
value of the issue exceeds their expectations.
In addition to the prospect theory, Loughran and Ritter (2002) summarised other explanations 
for the partial adjustment phenomenon. Investment bankers have presented that potential 
investors anchor on the midpoint of the offer price range as issuers do. If the final offer price 
will be too much higher than the midpoint, some of the potential investors withdraw from the 
offering. The simpler element of this argument is that raising the offer price reduces the 
excess demand. The more sophisticated element of the argument is based on cascades 
argument by Welch (1992): if investors pay attention to the behaviour of other investors, a 
remarkable increase of the offer price poses a risk to the issuer, because a withdrawal of some 
of the investors may cause many other investors to decide not to participate in the offering.
Leaning against the wind hypothesis states that investors in the IPO market tend to overreact. 
When the market is too hot, the market prices rise too high and above the long-run value of 
the share. The underwriters price the issues considering the long-run value of the firm. This 
phenomenon could provide one explanation to the partial adjustment phenomenon. Both 
supporting and inconsistent evidence has been found in empirical studies on the hypothesis 
(for negative results see e.g. Loughran and Ritter, 2002, and for positive ones see e.g. Ritter, 
1991).
If an issuer thinks that the issue was too heavily underpriced, investment bankers can claim 
that the higher than expected underpricing was due to their successful marketing efforts of the
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issue that caused the high demand for the issue. Consequently the share price may also come 
down before the lock-up period, which prevents the issuers from selling their shares during 
certain time, is over. This factor can also explain some of the partial adjustment (Loughran 
and Ritter, 2002).
Also bargaining power theories could serve as an explanation for the phenomenon (Daniel, 
2002). If the issuing firms believe that hot IPO markets are particularly good time to go public 
due to high valuation of the firms within their industry, their bargaining power against 
underwriters and institutional investors may be weak. In a cold IPO market the cost of delay 
for the issuer is lower and its bargaining power stronger, as the firm can credibly threat to 
postpone the issue.
3.6 Signalling theory and agency hypothesis
The signalling hypothesis developed by Leland and Pyle (1977) suggested that the original 
shareholders signal the value of their firm to outside investors by retaining equity in initial 
public offerings. The original shareholders have informational advantage over new potential 
investors regarding the value of the IPO. The owners may signal their information and 
confidence regarding the firm value to the market by retaining a high proportion of the shares. 
Signalling is costly to the entrepreneur, as by holding a larger share of the firm stock he 
forgoes diversification of his personal portfolio. Therefore, he retains significant ownership 
only if he expects the future cash flows of the firm to be on a high level relative to the current 
firm value. Investors see this and are therefore willing to pay more for the company’s shares 
in the IPO.
Downes and Heinkel (1982) tested the signalling theory by analysing the relation between the 
proportion of equity ownership retained by entrepreneurs and market value of the firm after 
the IPO. Their results supported strongly the signalling hypothesis. Keloharju and Kulp 
(1996) studied the signalling theory with a sample of 60 Finnish IPOs between years 1984 
and 1993 by using market-to-book ratio as the measure of market value. They documented a 
significant positive relation between the fraction of equity retained by the original 
shareholders and the market valuation, which is again in favour of the hypothesis by Leland 
and Pyle. On the other hand, Ritter (1984) did not find statistically significant support to the
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signalling hypothesis when he studied the relation between firm value and equity retention by 
insiders with US data.
Ljungqvist (1997) tested whether the hypothesis of the negative relationship between initial 
returns and retention rates presented by Wasserfallen and Wittleder (1994) holds in a sample 
of 189 German IPOs. The hypothesis was based on the assumption that by retaining more 
equity the original owners signal their commitment to the company and thus reduce the 
associated risk, which in turn should result in lower underpricing. Instead of the assumed 
negative impact, Ljungqvist found that insider retention rates are positively related to initial 
returns. Bradley and Jordan (2002) also documented a negative relation relationship between 
underpricing and equity retention. They explained the finding with the reduction in the costs 
of underpricing to the original shareholders if they retain more equity. As the shares retained 
by shareholders are valued at market prices, the finns with greater equity retention can afford 
to have higher level of underpricing.
Hence, the evidence regarding the applicability of signalling theory is contradictory. If 
signalling theory holds, the original shareholders can by retaining a significant proportion of 
the firm’s shares reduce the investors’ uncertainty regarding the value of the IPO. A large 
insider share ownership would thus imply lower uncertainty, which would be associated with 
a narrow initial offer price range and less price adjustment from the range midpoint to the 
final offer price.
Agency hypothesis (see Ritter, 1984) provides an alternative explanation for the relation 
between the firm value and insider holdings. Agency hypothesis assumes that an increase in 
ownership of managers reduces agency problems between owners and managers and therefore 
increases the firm value. If the managers own a large share of the firm, there will be less 
managerial shirking and less monitoring costs for the firm, which enhances the value of the 
company. Keloharju and Kulp (1996) analysed a sample of 60 Finnish IPOs and found a 
positive relation between the firm value and the management ownership supporting the 
agency hypothesis at low ownership levels, but the relation was not significant at high 
ownership levels.
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3.7 Venture capitalist certification theory
There are several studies on the effect of a third party certification on the pricing of initial 
public offerings. Certification theories are closely related to the signalling theory. The basic 
idea of the certification theory is that insiders have more information on the issue than the 
outside investors, but the involvement of a reputable third party reduces the uncertainty of the 
IPO in investors’ minds and serves as a signal that the firm going public is a good firm. Many 
of the studies have focused on the relationship between underwriter prestige and IPO pricing 
(see e.g. Beatty and Ritter, 1986) or auditor quality and IPO pricing (see e.g. Michaely and 
Shaw, 1995).
Also the role of venture capitalists (VCs) in IPO pricing has been studied in the financial 
research. Venture capitalist certification theory suggests that venture capitalists are able to 
reduce the infonnation asymmetry with respect to an initial public offering. The investors’ 
uncertainty regarding the value of an issue is reduced, as the involvement of venture 
capitalists as certifying agents signal the value and quality of an IPO to potential investors. 
Reduced uncertainty results in lower underpricing of IPOs. Megginson and Weiss (1991) 
found support for the venture capitalist certification theory by documenting lower 
underpricing for issues involving venture capitalists in comparison with similar issues without 
venture capitalist involvement. Their sample consisted of 320 VC backed and 320 non-VC 
backed IPOs between 1983 and 1987.
Jain and Kini (2000) documented that involvement of venture capitalists also improves the 
survival profile of IPOs. However, later studies have shown evidence against the venture 
capitalist certification theory. For example Bradley and Jordan (2002) discovered that venture 
capitalist backed firms usually incur higher level of underpricing, and after controlling certain 
effects causing this bias, no difference in underpricing was found between VC backed and 
non-VC backed IPOs.
3.8 Effect of market conditions on IPO pricing
Timing of the IPO is one of the main concerns for companies that consider going public (Brau 
and Fawcett, 2006). Managers try to take advantage of investor appetite and attractive stock
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prices when they think about the right timing for the IPO. Several studies have shown that the 
amount of IPOs fluctuates remarkably over time (see e.g. Ibbotson and Jaffe, 1975; Lowry, 
2003).
Lowry (2003) studied three potential explanations for the high fluctuation of IPO volume. She 
found that the business cycle is related to the IPO cycles: changes in firm’s demand for capital 
affect the IPO volume. Also changes in the level of investor optimism explain the IPO volume 
fluctuations. Furthermore, variation in investors’ uncertainty regarding the true value of finns 
had some significance in explaining the activity of IPO market, but not as much as the 
demand for capital and investor optimism.
In the context of studying initial offer price range, it is interesting to analyse whether market 
conditions affect not only the timing but also the pricing of IPOs. As first noted by Ibbotson 
and Jaffe (1975), high level of underpricing is followed by increased number of IPOs. 
According to Lowry and Schwert (2002), the average initial returns at the time when a 
company files an IPO do not contain any information about the level of underpricing for that 
company. Rather, underpricing is related to positive information learned during the IPO 
pricing process that is not fully incorporated into the final offer price, which causes higher 
underpricing of IPOs. Therefore companies cannot achieve lower underpricing by filing their 
IPOs during periods of low average initial returns. Companies file IPOs following periods of 
high initial returns, because the high returns are related to positive information obtained 
during the registration periods of the offerings, implying that companies can raise more 
money in an IPO than previously expected due to positive market demand.
Ljungqvist (1997) studied the relation between market returns and underpricing with German 
IPO data and found that favourable market conditions significantly increase initial returns. 
Lowry and Schwert (2004) documented that market returns both before setting the initial 
price range and during the filing process before the final price is set are positively related to 
the adjustment of the final offer price in relation to the midpoint of the offer price range.
The market indicators that the companies can look at when considering whether the market 
and investors’ appetite is favourable for a new issue are for example overall stock market 
conditions (Lucas and McDonald, 1990; Ritter and Welch, 2002), industry conditions (Pagano
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et al., 1998; Lowry, 2003), or recent first-day stock performance of IPOs (Lowry and 
Schwert, 2002). In practice, CFOs consider the overall market and industry conditions very 
important when considering the timing of the IPO, but do not pay that much attention to the 
recent first-day stock performance (Brau and Fawcett, 2006).
3.9 Summary of the literature review
Earlier studies have shown that the level of the offer price range is related to underpricing of 
IPOs (see e.g. Hanley, 1993; Loughran and Ritter, 2002; Lowry and Schwert, 2004). If the 
range is at a low level relative to the demand for the issue, the final offer price will be 
adjusted upwards from the range midpoint. However, positive information obtained during 
the IPO process is not fully reflected in the final offer price, which results in higher initial 
returns.
Hanley (1993) and Benveniste and Wilhelm (1997) used the width of the offer price range as 
a measure of the ex ante risk of the IPO. Underwriters who are uncertain of the issue price are 
likely to set wider offer price ranges to allow greater flexibility in determining the final offer 
price. Hanley documented that the wider the range, the greater is the change in the final offer 
price with respect to the expected offer price. Jenkinson et al. (2006) showed that the width of 
the range has relevance at least in Europe, as the bounds of the initial offer price range are 
seldom exceeded.
Many underpricing theories are based on the assumption that underpricing of IPOs results 
from uncertainty regarding the value of the IPO. Also the level and the width of the offer 
price range are assumed to be affected by the uncertainty regarding the IPO value. The more 
there is uncertainty regarding the value, the wider the initial price range is likely to be and the 
more adjustment from the midpoint of the initial range and the final offer price, as it is more 
difficult for the issuer and the arranger to estimate the correct price level for the offering.
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4 Data, methodology and hypotheses
4.1 Data
The sample used in the study contains 45 Finnish IPOs. The sample consists of IPOs of 
Finnish companies that have been listed to the Helsinki Stock Exchange between 1995 and 
2006. Only IPOs that had an initial offer price range set out in the prospectus are included in 
the sample, whereas all fixed price IPOs are excluded.
Even though the chosen window is as long as 12 years, the sample size is still limited due to 
the small size of the Finnish IPO market. The time limitation is necessary due to the 
availability and the quality of prospectuses.9 The regulatory requirements relating to the IPO 
pricing process have not changed significantly during the last ten years in Finland, even 
though the regulation sources and the market practices for example relating to the allocation 
of shares have changed to some extent. Changes in the regulation do not therefore cause 
remarkable data quality issues.
Prospectuses serve as the primary data source in the study. The data collection process was 
started by checking the availability of prospectuses and identifying IPOs that took place 
during the chosen period from the Helsinki Stock Exchange annual reports and from the 
collection of Finnish prospectuses at the Department of Finance in Helsinki School of 
Economics. Thereafter the data needed was collected from prospectuses at the Department of 
Finance in Helsinki School of Economics and from the web pages of the Financial 
Supervision and the listed companies.
Final offer prices are announced by the listed companies in a stock exchange release prior to 
IPOs. The announcements were collected from the websites of the respective companies and 
the website of the Nordic Exchange. The first-day closing prices of the IPOs were obtained
9 As Finnish securities legislation was still rather undeveloped during the 1980’s and yearly 1990’s, the amount 
and quality of information set out in prospectuses varied a lot.
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from the webpage of the Nordic Exchange. The stock exchange index data was obtained from 
the OMX / HEX database at the Department of Finance in Helsinki School of Economics.
Figure 3 presents the number of IPOs included in the sample by listing year. Most of the 
initial public offerings in the sample took place during years 1999 (11 IPOs) and 2000 (14 
IPOs), when the Finnish IPO market was hot and especially information, telecommunication 
and other high technology industries were booming. As a result, technology firm IPOs 
account for a major share of the sample representing 56% of the IPOs. After year 2000 the 
Finnish market has evidenced only eight initial public offerings with an offer price range.
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Offering year
Figure 3 Distribution of the sample IPOs by offering year.
The figure presents a histogram of the distribution of IPOs by the year of the offering in the sample of 45 Finnish 
IPOs between 1995 and 2006.
4.2 Methodology
The statistical characteristics of the offer price range width, the offer price range midpoint, the 
final offer price and the initial returns in the sample IPOs provide a useful base for analysing 
many aspects of the offer price ranges.
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Most of the hypotheses are tested by using the ordinary least squares (OLS) linear regression 
analysis with multiple variables. OLS regression analysis is a commonly used statistical 
method in financial research. It minimizes the sum of squared residual vertical distances 
between the data points and the regression line. OLS model can be presented as follows:
Yi=bо + b\xi\ + b2xn + ••• + bkxik + e, (1)
where Y¡ is the dependent variable that the regression model explains, xn, xi2, xik are 
independent variables, and e, is the error term. The intercept term is b0, and through bk 
are the partial slopes.
The coefficient of determination R2 is a commonly used measure of the predictive fit of the 
model. However, it does not decrease when new variables are added, which means that 
including all variables leads to the highest value. The adjusted R2 takes into consideration the 
number of explanatory variables included in the regression and measures therefore the 
regression fit in a more reasonable manner than R2. However, as the objective is to test the 
impact of various independent variables on the dependent variables rather than to find a 
model explaining the offer range in full, the coefficient of determination is not crucial in this 
study.
The statistical t-test measures the significance of the regression coefficients. T-value indicates 
the number of standard error measures of the coefficient from zero, and p-value measures the 
significance of the test that the coefficient differs from zero. P-values of 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 
are indicated with ***, ** and *, respectively.
The limited sample size of this study decreases the explanatory power of the regression 
model. The sample size also limits the number of explanatory variables that can be inserted to 
the model.
OLS regression analysis has been widely used in earlier research analysing similar dependent 
variables, which gives comfort to applying the OLS regression methodology also in this 
study. Daily et al. (2005) used multiple regression analysis when analysing the impact of firm
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and offering specific factors on the width of the offer price range. As regards testing the price 
adjustment, Lowry and Schwert (2004) and Hanley (1993) studied the effect of firm and deal 
specific characteristics and market returns on the price adjustment by using OLS regression 
analysis. Also initial returns have been widely studied by using traditional regression analysis 
approach (see e.g. Hanley, 1993). I construct several regression models to test the research 
hypotheses. The independent variables that the models try to explain are (i) the percent width 
of the offer price range; (ii) the percent change in the final offer price relative to the midpoint 
of the initial offer price range (the price adjustment); and (iii) initial returns.
Multicollinearity is controlled by running several different regression models and excluding 
highly correlated variables from the same models. Logarithms of chosen variables are used 
where appropriate to reduce skewness.
4.3 Research question and hypotheses
The research question set out earlier is to analyse the efficiency of the IPO pricing process 
and the determinants of the offer price range. More specifically, the thesis studies the effect of 
market conditions and firm and offering specific characteristics on the width of the initial 
offer price range and the level of the price range. The research question can be broken down 
into three categories and more specific hypotheses as follows:
A. Width of offer price range
1) Is there any observable pattern in Finnish range widths?
If there is some sort of consensus range or guidance by authorities that determines the 
range width, it can make further analysis of the determinants of the width 
meaningless.
2) Do firm and offering specific factors explain range width?
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Positive result signals that underwriters decide the width of the range taking into 
account factors that are generally associated with uncertainty regarding the IPO value.
3) Do market conditions before prospectus date explain range width?
Positive answer suggests that arrangers consider the uncertainty relating to market 
conditions when they set the offer price range.
B. Price adjustment (relation between the level of the price range and the final offer 
price)
4) Do firm and offering specific factors predict price adjustment?
Positive result implies that underwriters do not use all the available information when 
setting the initial offer price range.
5) Do changes in market index before setting of the initial offer price range explain price 
adjustment?
Positive result indicates that all public information is not incorporated into the initial 
offer price range.
6) Do changes in market index between the setting of the range and the setting of the 
final offer price explain the price revisions?
Positive result proposes that the final offer price is adjusted based on recent market 
conditions.
C. Level of the price range, final offer price and first-day closing price
7) Does price adjustment explain initial returns?
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Positive result indicates that final offer price is adjusted only partially on the basis of 
(private or public) information learned during filing period.
8) Do changes in market index before the IPO explain initial returns?
Positive result suggests that public information is not fully incorporated into the final 
offer price.
9) Is the midpoint of the offer price range a good estimator of the final offer price and 
the first-day closing price?
Positive result proposes that underwriters set the range at a relatively correct level and 
that pricing process is efficient at the first stage when the initial offer price range is 
set.
The detailed hypotheses on the expected relationships between the dependent and 
independent variables are presented below in the following paragraphs in connection with 
each variable.
4.4 Dependent variables
4.4.1 Percentage width of offer price range
I use regression analysis to identify factors that predict the width of the offer price range 
indicated in the prospectus. Daily et al. (2005) used the width of the initial offer price range 
set out in the prospectus in dollars as the dependent variable in their study. As this measure 
does not take into account the relative difference of the range in offerings with different price 
levels (e.g. a two dollar range is relatively wider for an offering with a midpoint of the range 
of five dollars than for an offering with a midpoint of ten dollars), the measure of the range 
width is scaled in this study. The width of the offer price range is measured as the percent 
width of the range, calculated as
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Width of the range = (Ph - Pi) /Ре, (2)
where Pu is the highest and Pi is the lowest price in the offer price range set out in the 
prospectus. Pe is the expected offer price, i.e. the midpoint of the range, and defined as {Рц + 
Pi) / 2. Jenkinson et al. (2006) used a similar measure when they documented widths of offer 
price ranges for a sample of European and US IPOs, whereas Hanley (1993) defined the width 
of the range with respect to the lower bound of the range. The measure used by Jenkinson et 
al. is chosen to enable a valid comparison with their sample, which included also European 
IPOs.
Underwriters who are uncertain of the price at which the issue could be sold to investors are 
likely to set wider offer ranges to provide more flexibility in setting the final offer price. The 
wider the offer range, the greater is the uncertainty regarding the true value of the IPO 
(Hanley, 1993). Variables that are associated with uncertainty regarding the IPO value are 
therefore expected to be positively related to the width of the range.
Width of the range is used in the analysis also as an independent variable predicting the 
change in the offer price from the range midpoint.
4.4.2 Price adjustment
Secondly, I form regression models that are expected to explain the revisions in the offer 
price. The change in the final offer price from the midpoint of the range is calculated as
Price adjustment = (Po - Pe) /Pe, (3)
where Po is the final offer price and PE is the midpoint of the range. The measure of price 
adjustment is consistent with earlier research (see e.g. Hanley, 1993; Lowry and Schwert, 
2002; Jenkinson et al., 2006). Pe is defined as the midpoint of the indicative offer price range 
set out in the prospectus, not the midpoint of the amended range in case a new range has been 
set during the IPO process.
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A large positive price revision indicates that the initial offer price range has been at a 
relatively low level and that the preliminary expectations of the issuing firm and underwriters 
regarding the issue price have been conservative. Respectively, a large negative price 
adjustment suggests that underwriters’ expectations of the value of the issue have been too 
positive.
The above measure of price adjustment is replaced with absolute price adjustment in this 
study in certain regression models where firm and offering specific variables explain price 
adjustment. Absolute price adjustment measures the absolute difference of final offer price 
from the midpoint of the range (see also Hanley, 1993). It is calculated as
Absolute price adjustment = | (Po - Pe) / Pe | (4)
This proxy is more appropriate when analysing the relation between firm and offering specific 
characteristics and price adjustment, as I focus on whether the chosen factors affect the 
magnitude of price revisions. If there is more uncertainty regarding the value of the IPOs, the 
absolute price adjustment is expected to be high, whereas non-absolute price adjustment could 
be either highly positive or highly negative.
4.4.3 Initial returns
The third dependent variable to be studied with regression models is the initial returns of the 
IPOs. Reasons for underpricing are not studied in detail in this study, but I focus merely on 
the relationship between the price adjustment and initial returns as well as market returns and 
initial returns to find out whether partial adjustment phenomenon can be observed also in the 
Finnish IPO market.
Following earlier research, the logarithmic first day returns are calculated from the first day 
closing price and the final offer price as follows:
Lognormal return = LN (first day closing price) - LN (offer price) (5)
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4.5 Independent variables
4.5.1 Pre-IPO stock market performance
The relationship between market returns and underpricing has been extensively analysed in 
several IPO pricing related studies (see e.g. Ritter and Welch, 2002). Also the impact of 
market returns on the changes in the offer price from the midpoint of the initial offer price 
range has been investigated (see e.g. Hanley, 1993; Lowry and Schwert, 2004).
The chosen proxy for the market conditions in this study is OMX Helsinki Cap index 
(OMXHCAP, formerly Hex Portfolio Index). It includes all the shares listed on the Helsinki 
Stock Exchange, but the maximum weight of one share is limited to ten percent of the total 
market value of the index. OMX Helsinki Cap index is considered to be more suitable for 
illustrating the general state of the Finnish stock market than OMX Helsinki All-Share index 
due to the high volume of trading of Nokia shares in the Helsinki Stock Exchange. Hex 
General Index is used for the two oldest IPOs in the sample, as Hex Portfolio Index was 
introduced only after these IPOs. However, this is not likely to cause reliability issue, as the 
weight of Nokia trading at that time was not as high as today.
When studying the effect of market conditions on the IPO pricing, it is useful to divide the 
market information into two stages, namely market information available before the initial 
offer price range is set and information available between setting of the initial range and the 
decision on the final offer price range. The initial offer price range is anticipated to reflect the 
market information by that time, whereas price adjustment is expected to take into account the 
public infonnation gained during the period before the IPO occurs.
Market conditions before the offer price range is set are measured with the percentage 
difference in the logarithmic values of OMXHCAP index between 90 days before the 
prospectus date and the prospectus date:
LN (OMXHCAP index value at 90 days before the prospectus date) - 
LN (OMXHCAP index value at the prospectus date) (6)
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Firstly, market returns are expected to be negatively related to the width of the offer price 
range. A positive market situation is anticipated to lead to a narrower price range due to the 
reduced uncertainty regarding the demand for the offering. Secondly, the efficiency of price­
setting process can be measured by analysing the relationship between market conditions 
before the indicative range is set and price adjustment from the range midpoint to the final 
offer price. There should not be any particular reason why price updates would be related to 
market returns before the initial range is set. If price adjustment can be explained with market 
returns before the prospectus filing, it indicates that IPO pricing is inefficient, as public 
information available before the initial price range is set is not fully incorporated into the 
level of the initial range (Lowry and Schwert, 2004). Market returns before offer price range 
is set are hypothesized to have positive impact on the price adjustment, suggesting inefficient 
pricing process.
Market returns during the period between the setting of the initial offer price range and the 
setting of the final offer price have been shown to be related to initial returns and price 
adjustment from the range midpoint to the offer price (see e.g. Hanley, 1993; Loughran and 
Ritter, 2002; Lowry and Schwert, 2004). Adjusting slightly the proxy used by Loughran and 
Ritter (2002)l0, I measure the market conditions during the filing period with the percentage 
difference of the logarithmic values of OMXHCAP index between 15 days before the listing 
date and one day before the listing date, as the final offer price is often decided one day before 
the public trading with the issuing firm’s shares begins:
LN (OMXHCAP index value at 15 days before the listing date) -
LN (OMXHCAP index value at 1 day before the listing date) (7)
Changes in the market from the prospectus date to the offer date are expected to be positively 
related to the adjustment in the offer price. New information that is likely to affect the stock 
market may be revealed after the initial price range is set. When market index increases
10 Loughran and Ritter (2002) categorised IPOs by market movement 15 trading days prior to the issue.
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during the filing period, increases also the offer price, and market falls are associated with 
decreases in offer price.
Partial adjustment hypothesis can be studied by analysing the impact of market returns on 
underpricing. If positive market information received shortly before the IPO occurs increases 
initial returns, it indicates that the final offer price has not been increased from the range 
midpoint as much as the market conditions would have allowed. Therefore, a positive relation 
suggests that underwriters do not adjust the final offer price to full extent on the basis of the 
public information received during the filing period, which supports the partial adjustment 
hypothesis. Following the evidence from earlier research (see e.g. Loughran and Ritter, 2002; 
Hanley, 1993), the hypothesis is that there is a positive relation between market returns and 
initial returns.
4.5.2 Firm and offering specific characteristics
Many studies on initial public offerings have used firm and offering specific information that 
can be found in the prospectus to predict some IPO pricing related phenomenon. The most 
commonly predicted phenomena are long-run returns (see e.g. Jain and Kini, 2000; Hensler et 
ah, 1997; Ritter, 1991) and first-day returns (see e.g. Ibbotson et al., 1988). Also survival of 
IPO firms has been studied by analysing the relation between offer specific factors and the 
IPO survival (see e.g. Bhabra and Pettway, 2003).
The range of factors used as indicators has been very wide. The characteristics used have 
included for example factors relating to ownership before and after the IPO (e.g. venture 
capital backing, founder ownership, equity retention of initial owners), firm characteristics 
(e.g. firm size, age, industry), financial information (e.g. profitability, earnings forecasts, 
financial leverage, level of R&D spending), offering characteristics (timing, offering size, 
reason for capital needs) and parties involved in the IPO (underwriter reputation, auditor 
quality). Common factor to all of these characteristics is that they in some way try to estimate 
the uncertainty relating to the IPO or the firm, which in turn affects the survival profile, level 
of underpricing or long-run performance. Since uncertainty cannot be observed, it needs to be 
proxied.
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I have chosen seven firm and offering specific characteristics that I consider relevant in 
predicting the width of the offer price range and the price adjustment. All of these factors are 
set out in the prospectus and are commonly used in earlier IPO related studies in some context 
as independent variables associated positively or negatively with uncertainty regarding the 
firm value.
4.5.3 Equity retention
Signalling theory assumes that equity retention is positively related to firm value. Following 
earlier studies (see e.g. Keloharju and Kulp, 1996; Ljungqvist, 1997), I define the equity 
retention signal as the fraction of shares retained by the initial shareholders after the IPO, 
which is calculated as the number of the shares held by the original shareholders after the IPO 
divided by the total number of shares after the IPO. The fraction of shares retained by the 
initial owners depends on both how many shares are offered to the public and whether the 
shares offered are primary shares or secondary shares. If the proportion of secondary shares in 
the total offering is very high, the retention ratio is lower, respectively.
If signalling theory holds, the original shareholders can by retaining a significant proportion 
of the company’s shares reduce investors’ uncertainty of the value of the IPO. A larger 
management share ownership would imply lower uncertainty and therefore a narrower offer 
price range and less adjustment in offer price. Thus, equity retention is expected to be 
negatively related to the width of the offer price range and price adjustment.
4.5.4 Executive ownership
Management ownership has been anticipated to reduce the agency problems between the 
owners and the management and therefore to be associated with higher firm value (see e.g. 
Ritter, 1984; Keloharju and Kulp, 1996). It is assumed that management ownership reduces 
the uncertainty regarding the IPO value. Hence, executive ownership is expected to have 
negative relation to the width of the price range and price revisions. Executive ownership is 
defined in this study as the number of shares held by the board and the operating management 
of the firm before the IPO to the total number of shares.
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4.5.5 Venture capitalist ownership
Certification theory is tested by analysing the effect of venture capitalist ownership of the 
firm on the offer price range. Venture capitalist involvement is easier to test than for example 
underwriter prestige, as investment bank rankings are not as established in the Finnish IPO 
market as in the US due to the small size of the market. Venture capitalist involvement is 
calculated as the percentage of the shares held by venture capitalist companies prior to the 
IPO.
The higher the share of the venture capitalists in the Finn’s equity, the stronger signal it is 
supposed to send to investors regarding the value of the offering. This should also lead to a 
narrower price range and less adjustment of the offer price due to the reduced uncertainty. 
Therefore a negative relationship is assumed between the venture capitalists’ ownership 
percentage and the width of the offer price range or the price adjustment.
4.5.6 Offering size
The inverse of the offering size has been widely used as a proxy for the uncertainty relating to 
the value of the share, and it has been empirically found that smaller offerings are on average 
more speculative than larger offerings (see e.g. Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Hanley, 1993; 
Ljungqvist, 1997). Hanley (1993) used offering size as a proxy for the uncertainty regarding 
the IPO value when analysing the determinants of revisions in offer prices.
The impact of offering size is measured by taking the natural logarithm of the offering 
proceeds. The anticipated offering proceeds are calculated as the midpoint of the offer price 
range times the number of the shares offered in the offering, excluding over-allotment options 
granted to underwriters. I use the midpoint of the range as the multiplier instead of the final 
offer price, as the final offer price is not known when the initial offer price range is set.
4.5.7 Company age
The age of the company has been used as a proxy for the risk of the share issue in IPO related 
literature. Older firms are able to reduce information asymmetry between the investors and
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the issuer by providing performance data over several years (Beatty and Ritter, 1986). A 
strong monotone relation has been documented both between the firm age and initial return 
and between the firm age and long-run performance (Ritter, 1991). Ritter found that older 
firms perform better in the long run than young firms, and Hensler et al. (1997) documented 
an increase in the survival time of IPOs with the age of the issuing firm.
Firm age is specified as the difference between the year of the offering and the founding year 
of the company. In case of IPOs of new spin-off companies, the founding year of the 
companies selling the shares in the new spin-off company has been used, as the business of 
these companies has been running for a longer period of time, even though the company may 
have been newly incorporated.
The younger the issuing firm, the more there is information asymmetry and uncertainty 
regarding the value of the issue. Therefore, the relation between firm age and width of the 
price range is expected to be negative as well as the relation between firm age and price 
adjustment.
4.5.8 Company size
The size of the company has been shown to reduce the uncertainty regarding the IPOs (see 
e.g. Schultz, 1993). Larger firms are better monitored than smaller ones, as they are likely to 
have more stakeholders that require information about the company. Furthermore, they have 
better access to investment capital and more diversified product lines, which reduces the risk 
relating to the IPOs of the larger firms (Bhabra and Pettway, 2003). Hensler et al. (1997) 
found also that the size of the IPO firm is positively related to its survival in the long run. Wu 
(2005) documented a negative relationship between firm size and initial returns of IPOs, 
indicating less uncertainty relating to the IPO.
Total assets of the firm has been widely used as a proxy for the firm size in IPO pricing 
related literature (see e.g. Lowry and Schwert, 2004; Wu, 2005). I measure firm size by the 
natural logarithm of total assets in the end of the last full financial year before the IPO.
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Due to the lower uncertainty relating to larger firms, the offer price range should be narrower 
and price adjustments less remarkable. Firm size is therefore expected to be negatively related 
to range width and price adjustment.
4.5.9 Profitability
Profitability of the Finn has generally been associated with lower uncertainty regarding its 
value. The profitability of the company prior to the IPO has been shown to be related to the 
future performance of the firm (Michaely and Shaw, 1995). Pre-IPO profitability of the firm 
should be associated with narrower range width (as hypothesized by Daily et al., 2005) and 
with lower degree of price adjustment. Profitability is measured by the ratio of EBITDA to 
total assets in the end of the latest full financial year before the IPO. The figures are taken 
from the prospectuses.
4.6 Control variables
In addition to the independent variables, I use three firm and offering specific factors as 
control variables in the analysis to ensure that the hypothesized relations are caused by the 
independent variables and not by other factors.
4.6.1 High technology industry
Firms operating within high technology industry are generally considered to be riskier than 
many traditional industry sectors. Share price volatilities are high in comparison with other 
industries, and Finnish stock markets experienced a rapid rise and fall of many high 
technology firms around year 2000 when the IT bubble burst. If the firm that offers its shares 
in the IPO operates within high technology industry, it is assumed to have a wider price range 
(as shown by Daily et al., 2005) and more adjustment in the final price in relation to the range 
midpoint. Industry is included in the test as a dummy variable by marking firms operating in 
high technology sectors with 1 and other firms with 0.
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4.6.2 Board size
Board size has been used as a proxy for uncertainty regarding the firm value (see e.g. Daily et. 
al, 2005). Higher number of board members should be associated with lower risk relating to 
the company. However, this proxy is at least in Finnish context not very reliable proxy for 
uncertainty and is therefore included only as a control variable.
Board size is measured by calculating the number of board members of the firm. When the 
number of board members is announced in the prospectus both before and after the IPO, the 
post-IPO number has been used, as it can be considered to have more impact on the firm 
value in the future.
4.6.3 Risk factors
The number of risk factors listed in the prospectus has been used as an indicator of the 
uncertainty regarding the value of the issuer (see e.g. Bhabra and Pettway, 2003; Hensler et 
al., 1997). The higher the number of risk factors, the riskier is the issue. Hensler et al. found 
that the survival time of the finns conducting IPOs decreases with number of risk factors set 
out in the prospectus.
The number of risk factors is calculated from the prospectuses where the risk factors have 
been set out as a separate section. As the number of risk factors set out in the prospectus has 
increased over time in Finland due to changes in the drafting practice of prospectuses, it is not 
a very reliable measure of uncertainty and therefore included in the regressions as a control 
variable only.
Table 1 presents the variables used in this study and their definitions, and Table 2 summarises 
the hypothesized relationships to be tested with regression analysis.
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Table 1 Summary of variables used in the regression analysis
Variable and code Definition
Percent width of offer price 
range {RANGER
(upper limit - lower limit) / midpoint of the offer price 
range
Price adjustment (PRICE 
ADJUST)
Percentage change between the midpoint of the offer price 
range and the final offer price
Absolute price adjustment 
(ABS PRICE ADJUST)
Percentage change between the midpoint of the offer price 
range and the final offer price in absolute terms
Initial returns (IR) LN (first day closing price) - LN (offer price)
Market index before setting 
initial range (OMXHCAP -90)
LN (OMXHCAP index value at 90 days before the 
prospectus date) - LN (OMXHCAP index value at the 
prospectus date)
Market index during filing 
period, i.e. before setting final 
price (OMXHCAP FILING)
LN (OMXHCAP index value at 15 days before the listing 




Fraction of shares retained by the original shareholders after 
IPO
Executive ownership (EXEC 
OWN)
Executive stock ownership percentage before IPO
VC ownership ( VC) Proportion of shares held by venture capitalists before IPO
Offering size (OFFERING 
SIZE)
LN (midpoint of the offer price range times the number of 
shares offered excluding the over-allotment option)
Firm age {FIRMAGE) Difference between the year of the offering and the founding 
year of the firm
Firm size {FIRM SIZE) Logarithm of the total assets of the company in the end of 
the financial year before IPO
Profitability {EBITDA /
ASSETS)
EBITDA/ASSETS for the financial year before IPO
High technology industry 
{HIGH TECH)
Dummy variable: marked with 1 if the company operates 
within high technology industry, 0 otherwise
Board size {BOARD SIZE) Number of board members (after IPO if specified)
Risk factors {RISKFACTORS) Number of risk factors set out in the prospectus
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Table 2 Summary of hypotheses to be tested with regression analysis
The table summarises the hypotheses for the regression models to be used in the analysis of the relations 







Market returns before prospectus date - + +
Market returns during filing period + +
Equity retention - -
Executive share ownership - -
Venture capitalist ownership - -
Offering size - -
Firm age - -
Firm size - -
Pre-IPO Profitability - -
Board size - -
High technology industry dummy + +






This section focuses on analysing and describing the characteristics of initial offer price 
ranges and its relation to the final offer price and the first-day closing price in Finnish IPOs in 
comparison with international studies. Table 3 presents statistics for the range width and 
differences between the midpoint of the range, the final offer price and the first-day closing 
price in the IPO sample.
Table 3 Descriptive statistics for offer price range
The table presents information about the initial offer price range, the final offer price and their relation to the 
first-day closing price for a sample of 45 Finnish IPOs conducted between 1995 and 2006. The width of the offer 
range is measured as (high bound of the range - low bound of the range) / range midpoint. Price adjustment is 
the percentage difference between the final offer price and the range midpoint, and absolute price adjustment 
gives the difference in absolute terms. Initial returns are calculated as the difference between the logarithmic 
values of the first-day closing price and the final offer price. IR relative to range midpoint refers to the 
percentage difference between the first-day closing price and the midpoint of the initial range.
Mean Median Std deviation Min Max
Range width in % 16,7% 16,7% 4,4 % 7,4 % 26,7 %
Range width in € 1,47 € 1,30 € 0,77 € 0,40 € 4,00 €
Price adjustment 0,6 % 3,7 % 14,7% -68,2 % 25,0 %
Absolute price adjustment 9,4 % 6,9 % 11,2% 0,0 % 68,2 %
Initial returns 15,2% 5,0 % 46,8 % -30,6 % 242,9 %
IR relative to range midpoint 18,3% 5,6 % 59,6 % -77,9 % 278,0 %
5.1.1 Width of offer price range
Table 3 shows that the average percentage width of the offer price range in the sample was 
16.7 percent. The result is in line with earlier literature. Jenkinson et al. (2006) found similar 
average range width (16.4%) for their sample of 740 European IPOs between January 1994 
and July 1999, and the average range width for the 2,930 US IPOs during the same period 
was 15.2%. Hanley (1993) documented an average range width of approximately 15% in her
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sample of 1,430 IPOs in the US between January 1983 and September 1987. However, the 
width was calculated in her study from the lower bound of the range, not from the midpoint.
The maximum and minimum percentage widths were 7.4% and 26.7%, and the standard 
deviation was 4.4%. The average width of the range in euros was € 1.47, and the median € 
1.30. The narrowest range was € 0.40, and the widest € 4.00. The price data for 12 IPOs for 
which the data is available only in Finnish marks has been converted into euros.
Figure 4 presents the distribution of the percentage widths of offer price ranges among the 
IPO sample. The most common range was from 16% to 20% with 17 IPOs. Also ranges from 
12% to 16% and from 20% to 24% were rather common. Most of the price ranges in the 
sample were between 8% and 24%, as only one IPO had a range narrower than 8%, and only 
two IPOs had a range wider than 24%.
Offer price range % width
Figure 4 Distribution of the offer price range percentage widths
The figure presents the distribution of percentage widths of the offer price ranges, measured as (high-point - 
low-point) / midpoint. The sample consists of 45 Finnish IPOs between 1995 and 2006.
Figure 5 presents a histogram of the distribution of the offer price range widths in euros in 33 
Finnish IPOs between 1999 and 2006. The IPOs with the pricing data in Finnish marks are
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excluded from the histogram. The histogram shows that there is no clear clustering of range 
widths to any single euro amount and that there is no convention in Finland with respect to a 
fixed euro width. There are six IPOs where the range is € 0.80, six IPOs with a € 2.00 range, 
five IPOs with a € 1.00 range, and four IPOs with a € 1.50 range. The result indicates that 
there is a tendency to set the range width to whole prices (e.g. one euro, one and a half euros, 
two euros).
Width of the offer price range in €
Figure 5 Distribution of the offer price range euro widths
The figure presents the distribution of the offer price range widths in euros in a sample of 33 Finnish IPOs 
between 1999 and 2006.
Jenkinson et al. (2006) noted that for European IPOs there is no consensus range, whereas in 
the US the range widths are determined on the basis of SEC guidance. The offer price range is 
set to $2 in almost all US IPOs (Ritter, 2003). Similarly, the results now obtained from the 
Finnish IPO market indicate that there is no commonly agreed range as a percentage width or 
a euro width that would be applied in offerings independent of different IPO characteristics, 
but that offer price ranges vary significantly. Therefore analysing the width of the offer range 
is relevant in the context of IPO pricing in Finland, and testing the impact of various factors 
on the width of the range may shed more light on the pricing process.
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Table 4 shows a comparison of range widths between IPOs that took place in 1999 and 2000 
and IPOs conducted during years 1995-1998 and 2001-2006. The Finnish IPO market 
witnessed 25 IPOs from 1999 to 2000, whereas there were only 20 IPOs during the other 
years included in the sample. Even though the IPO market was hot in those two years, the 
offer price ranges were not any wider. The average range width for IPOs in 1999-2000 was 
16.2%, which is somewhat below the average of IPOs during other years (17.3%).
Offerings with low offer prices had slightly wider offer price ranges than offerings with high 
offer prices per share, but the difference is not remarkable. The average width for IPOs with 
an offer price range midpoint below or at the median range midpoint of € 8.24 was 17.3%, 
whereas the average range width for IPOs with a range midpoint above the median was 
16.0%.
Table 4 Width of offer price range with respect to offering year and offer price per share
The table presents a comparison of offer price range widths for a sample of 45 Finnish IPOs between 1995 and 
2006. The width of the offer range is measured as (high bound of the range - low bound of the range) / range 
midpoint. The first two rows of the table show descriptive statistics for range widths in IPOs conducted during 
the hot IPO market years in Finland (1999-2000) and during other years included in the sample (1995-1998, 
2001-2006). The last two rows present descriptive statistics for range widths in IPOs where the midpoint of the 
range was below or at the median range midpoint of the sample (€ 8.24) and in IPOs with a range midpoint 
above the median.
Range width in % Observations Mean Median Std deviation Min Max
IPOs in 1999-2000 25 16,2% 16,2% 4,6 % 8,2 % 26,7 %
IPOs in 1995-1998, 2001-2006 20 17,3% 17,5% 4,3 % 7,4 % 25,5 %
IPOs with low share values 23 17,3% 17,1 % 4,5 % 9,1 % 26,7 %
IPOs with high share values 22 16,0% 16,3% 4,4 % 7,4 % 25,5 %
5.1.2 Price adjustment
Table 3 shows that the average price adjustment from the midpoint of the initial offer price 
range to the final offer price was only 0.6%, and the median 3.7%. The largest negative price 
revision in the sample was -68.2%, whereas the highest adjustment was 25%. The standard 
deviation was relatively high, 14.7%, which indicates that the price adjustments vary 
significantly. The average is lower than the median because of a few IPOs where the price
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was adjusted downwards remarkably. The average price adjustments in earlier studies are 
summarised in Table 5. Hanley (1993) documented an average price update of negative 4.3% 
in her sample of 1,430 IPOs issued from January 1983 to September 1987. The median 
revision in the offer price was zero. Lowry and Schwert (2004) found that the final offer price 
was on average 1.4% below the midpoint of the offer price range. Jenkinson et al. (2006) 
documented an average price update of 3.3% for European and 2.5% for American IPOs 
between January 1994 and July 1999. The results from the US appear to indicate that average 
price adjustment has moved from negative figure of 1980’s to above zero in the 1990’s. The 
results from the Finnish market documented in this study are close to the findings documented 
by Jenkinson et al. (2006) for European IPOs.
Table 5 Summary of documented average price adjustments in earlier studies
The table presents the results of earlier studies investigating price adjustment. Average price adjustment 
measures the change in the final offer price compared to the midpoint of the initial offer price range and is 
calculated as (P0 - Ре) /Ре, where P0 is the final offer price and PE is the midpoint of the range.
Research Sample Price adjustment
Hanley (1993) 1,430 IPOs in the US between January 
1983 and September 1987
- 4.3%
Lowry and Schwert (2004) 3,878 IPOs in the US in 1985-1997 - 1.4%
Jenkinson et. al (2006) 740 European IPOs between January 1994 
and July 1999
3.3%
Jenkinson et. al (2006) 2,930 IPOs in the US between January 
1994 and July 1999
2.5%
What does an adjustment of the offer price from the midpoint of the offer price range 
indicate? Firstly, it can imply that new information is received during book building, and the 
offer price is adjusted on that basis. A large price adjustment is a signal of high uncertainty 
regarding the true value of the issue, which makes pricing of the issue more difficult for 
underwriters and issuing firm.
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If the IPO pricing process is not efficient, a large price adjustment can also indicate that the 
initial offer price range was not set to an optimal level in the first place with respect to the 
market demand, whereas a small adjustment in price would be a signal of accurate pricing 
already at the stage of setting of the initial range. A large adjustment can also be interpreted as 
Lowry and Schwert (2004), who proposed that underwriters set the offer price range to a 
conservative level in case of risky IPOs, which then causes higher upward price adjustments.
Table 6 presents price adjustment statistics for IPOs in 1999 and 2000 and for IPOs occurred 
during the other years of the sample period of 1995-2006. The analysis shows that there was 
more adjustment between the range midpoint and the final offer price in IPOs that took place 
during the hot IPO years 1999 and 2000 than in other years, when excluding one IPO with an 
exceptionally high negative price adjustment (68%) in 2002 from the analysis. The average 
price adjustment in 1999-2000 was 8.9%, whereas the average during the other years was 
7.1% for the adjusted sample (10.1% if not adjusting the sample). The result indicates that 
there was somewhat more uncertainty regarding the offer prices during the active IPO years 
of 1999 and 2000.
Table 6 Price adjustment with respect to offering year
The table presents a comparison of price adjustments with respect to the offering year for a sample of 45 Finnish 
IPOs between 1995 and 2006. Absolute price adjustment is the percentage difference between the final offer 
price and the midpoint of the offer price range in absolute terms. The first two rows of the table show descriptive 
statistics for price adjustments in IPOs conducted during the hot IPO market years in Finland (1999-2000) and 
during other years included in the sample (1995-1998, 2001-2006). The last row presents descriptive statistics 
for price adjustments for the latter group excluding one observation with an exceptionally high price adjustment.
Abs. price adjustment % Observations Mean Median Std deviation Min Max
IPOs in 1999-2000 25 8,9 % 6,9 % 7,6 % 0,0 % 26,3 %
IPOs in 1995-1998, 2001-2006 
IPOs in 1995-1998, 2001-2006,
20 10,1 % 7,2 % 14,7 % 0,0 % 68,2 %
excl. 1 observation 19 7,1 % 6,7 % 5,7 % 0,0 % 25,0 %
52
5.1.3 Price range accuracy
Absolute price adjustment describes how far from the range midpoint the final offer price is. 
Table 3 shows that the final offer price differs from the range midpoint 9.4% on average, 
whereas the median is somewhat lower, 6.9%. In this light it seems that the midpoint of the 
initial offer price range generally predicts the final offer price in a relatively accurate manner 
in Finland. Table 7 presents the distribution of price adjustments in the IPO sample. In 71% of 
the IPOs the final offer price differs from the range midpoint less than ten percent and in one 
third of the IPOs less than five percent. Only eight IPOs had a positive price adjustment of 
more than ten percent, and only five had a negative adjustment of over ten percent.
Table 7 Distribution of the price adjustment in the sample
The table presents the price revisions in the sample of 45 Finnish IPOs between 1995 and 2006. The price 
adjustment is calculated as the percentage difference between the final offer price and the range midpoint, and 
the absolute price adjustment measures the same in absolute terms. The first panel categorises the IPOs based on 
the level of price adjustment, whereas the second panel describes the distance of the final offer price from the 
range midpoint.
Price adjustment over -10% -10% to 0% 0% to 10% over 10%
Number of IPOs 5 11 21 8
Proportion of IPOs 11,1 % 24,4 % 46,7 % 17,8%
Absolute price adjustment >5% 5% - 10% 10% - 20% over 20%
Number of IPOs 15 17 7 6
Proportion of IPOs 33,3 % 37,8 % 15,6% 13,3 %
The accuracy of the initial offer price range can also be measured by calculating the 
difference between the first-day closing price of the stock and the midpoint of the offer price 
range. It indicates whether the offer price range was at the right level compared to the market 
price of the share observed after the IPO. As highlighted in Table 3, the average difference 
was 18.3%, which is significantly lower than the differences of 27.6% for European IPOs and 
34.7% for US IPOs documented by Jenkinson et al. (2006). However, Jenkinson et al. 
analysed first-week closing price instead of first-day closing price, so the results are not fully 
comparable. In the sample used by Jenkinson et al., the German IPOs had a difference above 
56%, which increased the respective figure for whole Europe remarkably, as the German IPOs
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accounted for almost one third of the European IPOs in the sample. If Germany is excluded, 
the average difference between the closing price and the range midpoint was 15.1%. The level 
of the Finnish offer price ranges reflect the true market price therefore more accurately than 
the ranges in the US or in Germany, and are approximately as accurate as in many other 
European countries such as France, Belgium and the Netherlands (see Jenkinson et al., 2006).
5.1.4 Initial returns
First-day returns of the IPOs were 15.2% on average, which is somewhat higher than the 
initial returns of Finnish IPOs in the 1980’s (8.7%) documented by Keloharju (1993)." Ritter 
and Welch (2002) found an average initial return of 18.8 percent in their sample of 6,249 U.S. 
IPOs between 1980 and 2001. Median initial returns in this study were moderate five percent. 
The sample average is increased by a couple of hot IPOs during the IT boom were the first- 
day returns exceeded 100%.
5.1.5 Offer price with respect to upper and lower limit of range
Table 8 shows the distribution of final offer prices within the sample with respect to the initial 
offer price ranges. In general, the final offer prices of most Finnish IPOs remain within the 
initial range, as only six IPOs were finally priced outside the range. 40% of IPOs were priced 
at the higher bound of the initial range. Pricing the issues at the high end of the range is a 
common phenomenon in Europe. Jenkinson et al. (2006) found that 46.6% of European IPOs 
in their sample were priced at the high-point of the range. Even though the results from 
Germany where almost 72% of the offerings are priced at the higher limit have a strong 
impact on the overall European results, also in most other European countries the proportion 
of offerings price at the high-point clearly exceeds the figure observed with the data from the
11 Keloharju (1993) used a more sophisticated method of calculating initial returns, but as this study is focused 
more on initial offer range than underpricing, a simpler method is applied. The results are not therefore fully 
comparable.
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US. In the US, only 19.4% of the final offer prices were set to the higher bound, but the final 
offer price exceeded the limit of the range much more often than in Europe.
Table 8 Distribution of final offer prices compared to initial offer price range
This table presents the distribution of the sample of 45 Finnish IPOs during 1995 - 2006 comparing the final 
offer price to the initial offer price range.
Offer price relative to price range below at lower bound within at higher bound above
Number of IPOs 4 5 16 18 2
Proportion of IPOs 8,9 % 11,1 % 35,6 % 40,0 % 4,4 %
According to Jenkinson et al. (2006), this pattern results from institutional differences in the 
IPO process. In Europe, underwriters are able to exchange information about the demand and 
the pricing of the issue more freely with investors before the prospectus is filed. As a result of 
the information exchange, the offer price range can be set more accurately. The issuers and 
underwriters in Europe must commit to the initial range to be able to obtain private 
information from investors before setting the range. The results from Finnish IPOs are in line 
with the results from other European countries gathered by Jenkinson et al. The limits of the 
offer price range are not easily exceeded, and the final offer price often tends to lie at the 
high-point of the range.
Another reason for the companies to avoid exceeding bounds of the range in Finland is that 
investors have a possibility to cancel their subscriptions in the offering if the limits are 
exceeded, which creates a risk factor to the issuing finn. However, as the risk can be avoided 
by amending the initial offer price range before setting the final offer price, it is not likely to 
explain the phenomenon to full extent.
5.1.6 Statistics for independent variables
Table 9 presents the descriptive statistics of the other variables included in the regression. 
Below some interesting findings that are able to describe the characteristics of the IPO sample 
are highlighted.
55
The average retention percentage in the sample IPOs was 68.2%, which means that after IPOs 
the original shareholders still held over two thirds of the companies’ shares. Venture 
capitalists owned on average 16.5% of the firms conducting IPOs. However, the median is 
zero, as there have been more IPOs without VC participation than IPOs with venture 
capitalists. The maximum venture capitalist ownership in the sample was 95%. Executives 
owned before the IPO on average 27 percent of the firm’s shares. The mean company age at 
the IPO year was slightly over 26 years, the youngest firm being 1 year and the oldest 127 
years. As discussed earlier, over one half of the sample consisted of high technology firm 
IPOs.
Table 9 Descriptive statistics for independent and control variables
The table presents descriptive statistics for the independent and control variables in a sample of 45 Finnish IPOs 
between 1995 and 2006. OMXHCAP -90 is the difference in the logarithmic values of OMXHCAP index at 90 
days before the prospectus filing date and at the prospectus date; OMXHCAP FILING is the difference of the 
logarithmic values of OMXHCAP index at 15 days before the listing date and at one day before the listing date; 
RETENTION is the fraction of equity retained by initial owners after IPO; EXEC OWN is the proportion of 
shares owned by firm’s executives before IPO; VC is the proportion of shares owned by venture capitalists 
before IPO; OFFERING SIZE is the logarithmic value of the midpoint of the initial range times the shares 
offered; FIRM AGE is the difference between IPO year and founding year; ASSETS is the logarithmic value of 
total assets in €m in the end of the last full financial year before IPO; EBITDA / ASSETS is the ratio of EBITDA 
to assets in the end of the last full financial year before IPO; BOARD SIZE is the number of board members; 
HIGH TECH is a dummy variable that obtains the value one if the firm operates within high technology industry 
and zero otherwise; and RISK FACTORS is the number of risk factors set out in the prospectus.
Variable Mean Median Std deviation Min Max
OMXHCAP -90 4,0 % 4,7 % 13,4% -29,8 % 35,6 %
OMXHCAP FILING -0,3 % -0,7 % 4,2 % -9,6 % 13,3 %
RETENTION 68,2 % 70,3 % 15,1 % 20,0 % 99,7 %
EXEC OWN 27,0 % 14,1 % 32,1 % 0,0 % 100,0%
VC 16,5 % 0,0 % 29,0 % 0,0 % 95,0 %
OFFERING SIZE 3,8 3,8 1,5 -2,1 6,9
FIRMAGE 26,3 15,0 29,9 1,0 127,0
ASSETS 3,8 3,2 2,0 0,1 8,7
EBITDA /ASSETS 17,4% 17,1 % 16,5% -48,6 % 55,9 %
BOARD SIZE 5,6 5,0 1,4 3,0 9,0
HIGH TECH 55,6 % 100,0% 50,3 % 0,0 % 100,0%
RISK FACTORS 14,6 15,0 6,1 0,0 30,0
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5.2 Correlation
Correlation matrix (Table 10) shows that some of the independent and control variables used 
in the analysis are highly correlated. Venture capitalist ownership is negatively correlated 
with equity retention. The correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. This seems logical, as 
venture capitalists usually try to exit from their investment at the IPO stage and move on to 
the next potential investment target. Venture capitalists do not usually prefer staying as 
shareholders after the IPO, however lock-up period restrictions often prevent VCs to fully exit 
the investment immediately after the IPO. Negative correlation between finn’s profitability 
and VC involvement is unexpected, as it would indicate that venture capitalist take public less 
profitable firms.
High technology dummy has negative correlation with several other variables due to the 
nature of high technology firms. Firms within technology industry are often rather young 
firms in comparison with other industries, which can be seen as a negative correlation 
between firm age and high technology dummy. The strong negative correlation between high 
technology industry and total assets is caused not only by the young age but also by the fact 
that high technology industry finns do not usually own many valuable tangible assets. As 
high technology firms tend to be smaller, their issues are likely to be smaller too. Therefore, 
the negative correlation with offering size is natural. Finally, high technology dummy is 
positively correlated with the executive ownership, so the management of technology firms 
appear to have more shareholdings in their companies.
There is significant positive correlation between the firm age and assets. Older firms have had 
time to grow their business and balance sheet, so this correlation is logical. This is also the 
reason for the positive correlation between firm age and offering size.
A strong positive correlation can be found between offering size and firm size measured by 
total assets, which is not surprising. Large companies tend to have more board members, 
which is evidenced by very significant positive correlation between board size and assets. 
This clarifies also the correlation between board size and offering size. Significant positive 
correlation between offering size and number of risk factors listed in the prospectus can be 
explained by the fact that larger offerings are often more carefully prepared by advisers with
high prestige, which is likely to result in longer prospectuses with a more extensive list of risk 
factors. This interpretation questions the validity of the risk factors as a proxy for firm value 
uncertainty.
Executive share ownership has significant negative correlation with firm size, offering size, 
and number of board members. This indicates that management owns a larger proportion of 
shares in small companies than in large firms that are going public. The positive correlation 
between executive ownership and firm’s profitability is interesting, as it appears to propose 
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The relationship between the dependent and independent variables is tested with OLS 
regression analysis. Due to the limited sample size, all the variables cannot be inserted into 
the same regression model, but several regression models have to be constructed for each of 
the dependent variables. Significantly correlated independent and control variables identified 
in the correlation analysis (see Table 10) are excluded from the same models to avoid 
multicollinearity effects.
The coefficients of determination (adjusted R2) are generally rather low in the regression 
models. However, this observation is not very relevant, as the purpose of the regression 
models in this study is to analyse the impact of the independent variables to the dependent 
variables rather than to form comprehensive models explaining the dependent variables.
Below I report the most important findings of the analysis and present the results of some of 
the regression models constructed for the analysis.
5.3.2 Width of offer price range
Table 11 reports results of OLS regressions for the percentage width of the offer price range 
against the independent and control variables. Four different regression models are shown 
representing the most interesting results obtained from the analysis. Each of the independent 
variables is included in at least one of the models shown in Table 11.
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Table 11 OLS regression results for the width of the offer price range
The table presents OLS regressions with percentage width of the offer price range as the dependent variable for a 
sample of 45 Finnish IPOs between 1995 and 2006. The independent variables are the following: OMXHCAP - 
90 is the difference in the logarithmic values of OMXHCAP index at 90 days before the prospectus filing date 
and at the prospectus date; RETENTION is the fraction of equity retained by initial owners after IPO; EXEC 
OWN is the proportion of shares owned by firm’s executives before IPO; VC is the proportion of shares owned 
by venture capitalists before IPO; OFFERING SIZE is the logarithmic value of the midpoint of the initial range 
times the shares offered; FIRM AGE is the difference between IPO year and founding year; ASSETS is the 
logarithmic value of total assets in €m in the end of the last full financial year before IPO; EBITDA / ASSETS is 
the ratio of EBITDA to assets in the end of the last full financial year before IPO; BOARD SIZE is the number of 
board members; HIGH TECH is a dummy variable that obtains the value one if the firm operates within high 
technology industry and zero otherwise; and RISK FACTORS is the number of risk factors set out in the 
prospectus. T-statistics are in brackets. Statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level is indicated with 
***, **, and *, respectively.
Variable Predicted
sign
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 0,156 0,170 0,128 0,135
(8,973) (5,010) (4,036) (6,726)
OMXHCAP -90 - -0,077 -0,068 -0,062 -0,051
-(1,713)* -(1-374) -(1,219) -(1,068)
RETENTION - -0,026
-(0,594)
EXEC OWN - -0,044
-(2,332)**
VC - -0,014 -0,007
-(0,569) -(0,306)
OFFERING SIZE - 0,011
2,737***




EBITDA /ASSETS - -0,043 -0,042
-(1,066) -(1,041)
BOARD SIZE - 0,006
(1,211)
HIGH TECH + 0,017
(1,234)
RISK FACTORS + 0,001
(1,294)
Observations 45 45 45 45
Adjusted R2 0,181 0,086 0,014 0,153
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A negative relation was found between the width of the range and executive ownership in the 
issuing companies. The relation is statistically significant, as the p-value for the coefficient is 
0.025. The result appears to be consistent with the agency hypothesis (Ritter, 1984), which 
predicts that an increase in ownership of managers reduces agency problems between owners 
and managers and therefore increases the firm value. Keloharju and Kulp (1996) analysed a 
sample of 60 Finnish IPOs and found a positive relation between the finn value and the 
management ownership supporting the agency hypothesis at low ownership levels, whereas 
the relation was not significant at high ownership levels. In the context of initial offer price 
ranges it can be interpreted that the uncertainty regarding the firm value is reduced, if the 
conflict of interest between the executives and the future owners (investors participating in 
the IPO) is lower due to the higher share ownership by the managers and board members. 
Hence, the range width is narrower than in offerings where the executives own smaller share 
of firm’s equity.
Statistically significant relations were identified with finn size and offering size variables at 
the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. However, instead of the expected negative relation with 
the range width, the coefficients for total assets and anticipated offering proceeds were 
positive. Firm size and offering size were assumed to be associated with lower uncertainty 
regarding the value of the issue and hence the narrower range width, but the results clearly 
reject the hypothesis.
The assumption that firm size reduces the uncertainty relating to the firm has received support 
in the earlier research, as it has been found that company size is positively related to the long 
run survival of the firm (Hensler et al., 1997) and negatively related to initial returns (Wu, 
2005). Daily et al. (2005) studied the impact of firm size on the width of the range, but did not 
find significant evidence on the assumed negative relation between firm size and range width. 
The relation between offering size and range width has not been reported in earlier literature, 
but the inverse of offering size has been used as a proxy for uncertainty regarding the IPO 
value in many studies (see e.g. Hanley, 1993; Ljungqvist, 1997). Therefore, the results 
obtained regarding firm size and offering size are surprising and do not support the 
assumption that the width of the range is related to the uncertainty regarding the finn value.
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Market conditions before the prospectus date were negatively related to the width of the offer 
price range as anticipated. However, the result is statistically significant only at the 0.10 level 
and only in some of the regression models, so the finding does not provide particularly strong 
support for the hypothesized negative relation. Also Jenkinson et al. (2006) investigated 
whether the level or recent volatility of local market indices affected the width of offer price 
ranges in European IPOs, but found no evidence on such relation.
Also some other assumed relations between the independent variables and the range width 
were identified, such as the negative impact of profitability to the range. However, none of the 
other variables included had a statistically significant impact on the width of the offer price 
range, so their anticipated effect on the range width does not receive support. Control 
variables did not have a statistically significant impact on the dependent variable.
5.3.3 Price adjustment
Table 12 presents the regression results for the models predicting price adjustment. The 
dependent variable in the regression models was the absolute change in the final offer price 
relative to the midpoint of the range, except for models analysing the market indices where 
the standard percentage price adjustment was used.
The explanatory power of market conditions was studied with two independent variables. 
Changes in the market index were analysed both for a 90 days’ period before the prospectus 
date and for a period from 15 days before the listing date to one date before listing date, but 
neither of these proxies had a significant impact on the price adjustment.
The result regarding the changes in the market index during the filing period is somewhat 
surprising, as it is reasonable to assume that changes in the market conditions cause a 
respective change in the final offer price. Also earlier research has shown a significant 
relation between market returns before the IPO and price revisions with respect to the initial 
range. Hanley (1993) noted that changes in the market index during the filing period can 
predict price revisions, and also Loughran and Ritter (2002) found that price revisions are 
significantly related to market returns during 15 days before the offering.
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Table 12 OLS regression results for the price adjustment
The table presents OLS regressions for a sample of 45 Finnish IPOs between 1995 and 2006 with the price 
adjustment as the dependent variable. Price adjustment is the percentage difference between the final offer price 
and the initial offer price range midpoint. In models 2 and 3 the dependent variable is in absolute terms. The 
independent variables are the following: RANGE is the percentage width of the offer price range; OMXHCAP - 
90 is the difference in the logarithmic values of OMXHCAP index at 90 days before the prospectus filing date 
and at the prospectus date; OMXHCAP FILING is the difference of the logarithmic values of OMXHCAP index 
at 15 days before the listing date and at one day before the listing date; RETENTION is the fraction of equity 
retained by initial owners after IPO; EXEC OWN is the proportion of shares owned by firm’s executives before 
IPO; VC is the proportion of shares owned by venture capitalists before IPO; OFFERING SIZE is the 
logarithmic value of the midpoint of the initial range times the shares offered; FIRM AGE is the difference 
between IPO year and founding year; ASSETS is the logarithmic value of total assets in €m in the end of the last 
full financial year before IPO; EBITDA / ASSETS is the ratio of EBITDA to assets in the end of the last full 
financial year before IPO; BOARD SIZE is the number of board members; HIGH TECH is a dummy variable 
that obtains the value one if the firm operates within high technology industry and zero otherwise; and RISK 
FACTORS is the number of risk factors set out in the prospectus. T-statistics are in brackets. Statistical 
significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level is indicated with ***, **, and *, respectively.
Variable Predicted (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
sign
Intercept 0,100 0,085 -0,141 0,222 -0,014
(1,510) (1,463) -d,578) (4,377) -(0,126)
RANGE + -(0,035)
-(0,090)
OMXHCAP -90 + 0,054
(0,325)
OMXHCAP FILING + -0,174
-(0,325)
















HIGH TECH + 0,009
(0,282)
RISK FACTORS + 0,004 0,003
(1,257) (U58)
Observations 45 45 45 45 45 45 45
Adjusted R2 -0,023 -0,021 -0,021 0,028 0,080 0,143 0,129
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Lowry and Schwert (2004) found that in addition to the positive effect of market returns 
during the filing period on the price adjustment, also market returns before the initial offer 
price range are significantly related to the price adjustment, which suggests that underwriters 
do not incorporate all the public information to the initial range. Similar conclusion cannot be 
drawn with respect to the Finnish IPO market on the basis of this analysis, as no evidence on 
the relationship between the market conditions before the IPO and price revisions was found.
Hanley (1993) used the range width as a proxy for the uncertainty regarding the IPO value 
when she analysed the determinants of revisions in offer prices and found that the wider the 
range, the greater is the absolute change in the final offer price. However, in Finnish IPO 
market the width of offer price range does not have a significant impact on the price 
adjustment. The finding is surprising, as a wider range would allow more adjustment within 
the offer price range. As shown by Jenkinson et al. (2006), in European IPOs the final offer 
price exceeds the limits of the initial range more seldom in comparison with IPOs in the US. 
As presented earlier, the offer price usually remains within the offer price range also in the 
Finnish IPOs. It would be therefore logical to assume that larger offer price revisions are 
associated with wider ranges especially in European IPOs. However, Jenkinson et al. (2006) 
showed that the average range width is only slightly higher in European IPOs (16.4%) than in 
US IPOs (15.2%).
Offering size is negatively related to the absolute price adjustment as expected. The finding is 
significant at the 0.05 level. In earlier studies Hanley (1993) found no statistically significant 
relation between the expected issue size and the absolute price adjustment, whereas Lowry 
and Schwert (2004) showed that proceeds filed and price adjustment are positively related in 
their sample. The result from this analysis could mean that underwriters set the initial offer 
price range at a more conservative level in case of small issues as proposed by Lowry and 
Schwert. Small offerings are generally considered riskier, and the inverse of the offering 
proceeds has commonly been associated with the uncertainty regarding the firm value (see 
e.g. Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Ljungqvist, 1997). As the measure for the price update in this 
analysis is in absolute terms, the results could be interpreted also in another way. The range 
for smaller offerings is not necessarily set at a lower level on purpose by the underwriters, but 
rather it is more difficult for them to set the range at a right level due to the uncertainty 
regarding the true value of the offering.
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Venture capitalist ownership is significantly negatively related to the price adjustment in the 
models presented in Table 12 at the 0.05 and 0.10 levels. The results are consistent with the 
venture capitalist certification theory, even though the statistical significance of the findings is 
not very high. The involvement of venture capitalists reduces the uncertainty regarding the 
IPO value in investors’ minds, and therefore the initial offer price range can be set to a 
suitable level. Hence, there is less need for adjustment in the offer price from the midpoint of 
the initial range. Earlier evidence regarding venture capitalist certification hypothesis is 
controversial. Megginson and Weiss (1991) found support for the venture capitalist 
certification theory, whereas Bradley and Jordan (2002) came to the opposite conclusion.
Equity retention has a positive and significant coefficient with the dependent variable at the 
0.05 level. The result is against the hypothesis, as equity retention of the initial shareholders 
was anticipated to give a positive signal of the firm value to investors in accordance with the 
signalling hypothesis by Leland and Pyle (1977). The impact of equity retention rates on price 
update has not been studied earlier. Downes and Heinkel (1982) and Keloharju and Kulp 
(1996) found a positive relationship between the firm value and retention rates. In contrast, 
Bradley and Jordan (2002) and Ljungqvist (1997) showed that equity retention is positively 
related to initial returns, which speaks against signalling theory. The result now obtained is in 
line with the latter studies. Equity retention seems to increase the price revisions from the 
range midpoint, and it does not reduce the risk relating to the issue or help underwriters to set 
the initial offer price range at an appropriate level. A simple argument on behalf of signalling 
theory would be that equity retention reduces the risk relating to the issue causing therefore a 
higher increase in offer price. However, this interpretation is not correct, as the level of equity 
retention is already known when the initial range is set. The level of the range should 
therefore already reflect this information, and thus it should not cause a high price adjustment.
Other independent variables were not able to predict the price adjustment in a statistically 
significant manner. Control variables did not have significant impact on the dependent 
variable.
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5.3.4 Initial returns and price adjustment
Table 13 presents the results for the regression models predicting initial returns. A significant 
positive relation is found between price adjustment and first-day returns with a p-value of as 
high as 0.003. This finding gives strong support to the partial adjustment hypothesis 
indicating that underwriters do not adjust the final offer price to full extent on the basis of the 
positive information learned during IPO process. It can be assumed that issuing firm and 
underwriters obtain additional information after the initial offer price range is set, but do not 
incorporate this information fully to the final offer price. A smaller increase in offer price in 
turn results in higher underpricing. Similar results have been documented earlier with data 
from the US. Hanley (1993) presented that price adjustment is positively related to initial 
returns and that offerings where the final offer price exceeds the upper limit of the initial 
range incur higher initial returns. Also Lowry and Schwert (2004) and Loughran and Ritter 
(2002) have shown that price adjustment has a positive impact on initial returns. The positive 
relation suggests that there is partial adjustment to (private and/or public) information 
received before the final price is set.
Table 13 OLS regression results for initial returns
The table presents OLS regressions for a sample of 45 Finnish IPOs between 1995 and 2006. The dependent 
variable is initial returns, calculated as the difference between the logarithmic values of the first-day closing 
price and the offer price. The independent variables are the following: PRICE ADJUSTMENT is the percentage 
difference between the final offer price and the initial offer price range midpoint; OMXHCAP -90 is the 
difference in the logarithmic values of OMXHCAP index at 90 days before the prospectus filing date and at the 
prospectus date; OMXHCAP FILING is the difference of the logarithmic values of OMXHCAP index at 15 days 
before the listing date and at one day before the listing date. T-statistics are in brackets. Statistical significance at 
the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level is indicated with ***, **, and *, respectively.
Variable Predicted (1) (2) (3)
sign














Adjusted R2 0,174 0,090 0,036
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According to the theory by Benveniste and Spindt (1989), the positive private information 
received from investors during book building cannot be fully incorporated into the final offer 
price, as the investors that have provided such information to the underwriters have to be 
rewarded for revealing information. Later on many studies have found that public information 
can explain initial returns, which is against the hypothesis by Benveniste and Spindt (see e.g. 
Loughran and Ritter, 2002; Kent, 2002; Lowry and Schwert, 2004). A positive relation 
between market returns before the IPO and first-day returns would suggest partial adjustment 
to public information.
However, market conditions during the filing period do not seem to be relevant for 
underpricing in the Finnish IPO market, as the percent difference between market index 15 
days before the listing date and one day before the listing date does not have a statistically 
significant impact on initial returns. The result does not follow the results of recent IPO 
pricing related research. Hanley (1993) showed that the change in NASDAQ index between 
prospectus date and offer date is positively related to initial returns. Lowry and Schwert 
(2002) suggested in their study that initial returns are driven by the information that is learned 
during the registration period but only partially incorporated into the final offer price. In 
addition, Loughran and Ritter (2002) categorised IPOs by the market movement in the three 
weeks before the issue and documented average first-day returns of 10.0% following market 
declines, and average first-day returns of 18.5% when the market has risen by at least 2.0%.
In contrast, the percent difference between market index 90 days before the prospectus date 
and the prospectus date is positively related to initial returns. The finding is significant at the 
0.05 level. It appears that investment bankers do not incorporate all market information 
available to them to the initial offer price range. The relation between market returns before 
the initial range is set and underpricing has not been documented earlier, but Daniel (2002) 
showed that initial returns are significantly related to three months’ market returns before the 
IPO. Even though Daniel’s study included therefore both market conditions before the 
prospectus date and between the prospectus date and listing date, his results are to some 
extent comparable with the results obtained with the Finnish data.
The finding is surprising, as information about the market conditions could be taken into 
account already when setting the initial offer price range. The prospect theory by Loughran
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and Ritter (2002) proposes that issuers care about the change in their wealth rather than the 
level of wealth, and therefore they do not mind leaving money on the table as much when the 
value of the company and thus their wealth after the IPO is higher than they expected. 
However, the reference point to the issuers is the initial range, the level of which should be set 
on the basis of the information available at that time. Therefore, the prospect theory does not 
seem to explain the identified relation much better than the dynamic information acquisition 
hypothesis proposed by Benveniste and Spindt (1989). Daniel (2002) presented an alternative 
theory for the phenomenon, which is based on bargaining power of the issuers. If the issuing 
firms believe that hot IPO markets are particularly good time to go public due to high 
valuation of the firms within their industry, their bargaining power against underwriters and 
institutional investors may be weak. On the other hand, in a cold IPO market the cost of delay 
for the issuer is lower, and therefore its bargaining power stronger, as the firm can credibly 
threat to postpone the issue. The theory may have merit in explaining the evidenced relation 
between market returns before prospectus filing and initial returns in the Finnish IPO market.
5.4 Summary and interpretation of results
There is no standard width of initial offer price ranges in Finland, which makes it worthwhile 
to study the determinants of the width of the offer price range. The range widths vary both 
with respect to the relative width and to the euro width. In the light of the results obtained 
with the regression models predicting the offer price range, it can be concluded that the width 
of the offer price range in Finnish IPOs cannot be explained very well with firm and offering 
specific characteristics that are generally associated with IPO value uncertainty. The 
anticipated negative relationship between the executive ownership and range width was 
documented, which supports the agency theory. IPOs with large finns and sizeable offerings 
are associated with wide offer price ranges, which is an unexpected result given the results in 
earlier research indicating a negative relation between the uncertainty regarding the firm value 
and offering and firm size. Market conditions before the prospectus date had a negative effect 
on the range width, but the statistical significance of the finding is not very high. 
Underwriters seem to consider firm and offering specific factors and market conditions to 
some extent when they are deciding the range width, but these factors do not appear to be 
crucial for their decision making.
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The first stage of the IPO pricing process seems to be relatively efficient in Finland. The 
midpoint of the initial offer price range predicts the final offer price rather accurately, as the 
average price adjustment from the range midpoint is less than 10%. The average difference 
between the range midpoint and the first-day closing price is 18%, which follows the figures 
presented by Jenkinson et al. (2006) for European IPOs.
The final offer price rarely exceeds the limits of the initial offer price range in the IPO 
sample. The evidence supports the proposition by Jenkinson et al. (2006) that points out the 
institutional differences in the IPO markets in the US and in Europe. In European IPOs, 
information exchange between issuers and investors already before the initial offer price 
range is set provides the issuing firm with information about the appropriate price level, but 
also gives them pressure to commit to setting the final price within the initial range.
It seems that underwriters in Finland do not adjust the final offer price on the basis of the 
market information received during the filing period. Thus, a possible market upturn incurred 
just before the IPO would not increase the offer price and offerings taking place when the 
market conditions have turned positive would have higher underpricing in Finland than for 
example in the US, where price adjustment is related to market movements. However, no 
evidence on the relation between positive market returns during the filing period and initial 
returns was found, which reduces the significance of the identified inefficiency in the pricing 
process. Market conditions before the prospectus date do not explain the price update, which 
indicates that existing market information is already reflected in the level of the initial offer 
range.
Some firm and offering specific characteristics predict the price adjustment from the range 
midpoint to the offer price. A large size of the offering is associated with lower changes in the 
offer price as expected, and a negative relationship between venture capitalist ownership and 
price adjustment was found supporting the venture capitalist certification theory. Equity 
retention was found to be positively related to price revisions, so the signalling hypothesis is 
clearly rejected.
Evidence from regressions predicting initial returns provide strong statistical support for 
partial adjustment hypothesis in the Finnish IPO market. The adjustment in offer price from
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the midpoint of the offer price range is positively related to underpricing. Contrary to recent 
IPO pricing related research, no partial adjustment to public information learned during the 
IPO process was identified, as there is no relation between market returns during the 
prospectus filing period and first-day returns. A positive relation between the market returns 
before the initial offer price range is set and initial returns is unexpected, as it seems to 
suggest that the initial offer price range is set without taking into consideration the market 
conditions. Bargain power hypothesis by Daniel (2002) may be a possible explanation for the 
phenomenon.
5.5 Reliability, validity and generalizability
Data quality affects the reliability of the analysis. As the data has mostly been gathered from 
prospectuses, the possible reliability problems with databases have been avoided. The quality 
of the prospectuses has clearly varied over time and depends on the size of the IPO. Most of 
the data collected from prospectuses is reliable, but some of the factors collected called for 
interpretation and judgment. Also the possibility of human errors is present when manually 
collecting information from prospectuses. The index data gathered from HEX / OMX data 
base is considered to be reliable.
Validity of the analysis depends on the factors chosen to explain the dependent variables. It is 
possible that all of the chosen independent and control variables are not associated with 
uncertainty regarding the IPO. Other possible variables indicating uncertainty of the IPO that 
could have been used in the analysis include for example leverage, level of R&D spending, or 
underwriter prestige. Also other proxies for certain firm and offering specific characteristics 
could have been chosen, such as sales or number of employees as a proxy for company’s size. 
The proxies for the range width and the price adjustment are considered valid, as similar 
proxies have been used in earlier research. The absolute price adjustment in regressions with 
firm and offering specific variables provided a better measure for price revisions.
Generalizability of the results can be negatively affected by the large share of IPOs of high 
technology firms during the IPO bubble in 1999 and 2000 in the sample. As these issues are 
generally considered to be riskier, they may have significant impact on the analysis and 
potentially cause a bias towards more uncertainty in the Finnish IPOs. However, it also has to
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be noted that there are relatively many technology firms listed in the Helsinki Stock 
Exchange. The small size of the sample and the Finnish IPO market in general limits the 
generalizability of the results in a wider context.
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6 Conclusion
6.1 Subject of the study
This study analysed the IPO pricing process from a slightly different view than most of the 
earlier research relating to the IPO pricing. The focus was on how the initial offer price range 
in IPOs is determined and on the role of the range in the IPO pricing process. The paper 
studied the effect of market conditions and firm and offering specific characteristics on the 
width and the level of the initial offer price range. The width of the offer price range and the 
magnitude of the price adjustments from the range midpoint were expected to be affected by 
factors that generally indicate uncertainty regarding the value of the issue. Risky issues were 
assumed to have wide offer price ranges and large price revisions, and vice versa.
Also the efficiency of the IPO process is studied by analysing whether underwriters 
incorporate all public information available to them to the initial offer price range and the 
final offer price, and observing how well the range midpoint predicts the final offer price and 
the market price observed after the IPO. Following earlier research, the study tested whether 
partial adjustment phenomenon can be observed also in the Finnish IPO market.
The data consisted of a sample of 45 Finnish IPOs that had an initial offer price range and that 
occurred between January 1, 1995 and December 31, 2006. The characteristics of the offer 
price range were analysed with descriptive statistics, and the impact of various firm, offering 
and market related factors on the width of the offer price range, the price adjustment from the 
range midpoint to the final offer price, and initial returns was studied with ordinary least 
squares regression with multiple variables.
6.2 Main findings
The final offer price remains usually within the initial offer price range, which points out the 
significance of the width and the level of the initial range. The width of the offer price range 
varies, as no standard percentage or euro range is applied in Finland. The average percent 
width of the offer price range in the sample was 16.7 percent, and the maximum and 
minimum widths were 26.4% and 7.4%. As the range width varies, it is meaningful to analyse
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what are the determinants of the range width and to assume that the range width is associated 
with the uncertainty regarding the value of the IPO.
Firm and offering specific characteristics that are generally associated with uncertainty do not 
predict the width of the offer price range particularly well. A significant relationship between 
executive ownership and width of the range was found, which supports the agency hypothesis 
by Ritter (1984). However, most of the chosen firm or offering specific factors do not have 
impact on the range width. Similarly, the assumption that market conditions would affect the 
range width did not receive very significant support. In this light it seems questionable 
whether the width of the range is related to the uncertainty of the IPO value. As the width of 
the offer price range is not determined by the Financial Supervision or a market convention, 
the question of what determines the width of the offer price range remains partly unanswered.
The midpoint of the range predicts the final offer price rather well in Finnish IPOs, as the 
final offer price differs from the range midpoint on average less than 10%. The average 
difference between the range midpoint and the first-day closing price is approximately 18%, 
which is comparable to many other European countries and significantly lower than in the 
US. The finding indicates that the pricing process in Finland is relatively efficient at the first 
stage when the initial offer price range is set. In 87% of the Finnish IPOs the final offer price 
remained within the offer price range, and 40% of the offerings in the sample were priced at 
the higher bound of the initial offer price range. The results support the conclusions by 
Jenkinson et al. (2006), who proposed that the limits of the offer price range are exceeded 
much more often in the US than in Europe due to institutional differences. As underwriters in 
Europe are able to exchange information with investors prior to setting the initial range, the 
midpoint of the range is a more accurate estimate of the market value in Europe than in the 
US. In response to the information received before the offer price range is set, a commitment 
to stay within the range is necessary causing the bias towards the high point of the range.
Market information available to underwriters before the level of the offer price range is 
decided is related to initial returns. The finding would imply that IPO pricing is inefficient, as 
the initial offer price range does not fully reflect the market infonnation available at that time. 
However, as in Finland the difference between the midpoint of the range and the market price
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observed after the IPO is still reasonably small, the practical significance of the finding is not 
remarkable.
Partial adjustment phenomenon can be identified also in the Finnish market, as the initial 
returns were found to be significantly and positively related to the price adjustment. This 
indicates that the final offer price is not fully adjusted on the basis of the positive information 
learned during book building, which results in higher underpricing. In contrast to the previous 
studies on the US market, underpricing was not found to be related to market returns during 
the filing period. Therefore, it seems that in Finland the final offer price is only partially 
adjusted to private information learned during the book building, and that investors are 
rewarded for the information with a higher level of underpricing.
As market conditions during the filing period do not have any significant impact on the 
change in the offer price, it appears that Finnish underwriters do not adjust the final offer 
price on the basis of the market information observed before the final offer price is decided. 
However, as the market conditions during the filing period were neither related to initial 
returns, the finding does not imply a clear inefficiency in pricing.
Some firm and offering specific characteristics were shown to predict the price adjustment 
from the range midpoint to the offer price. Large offering size is associated with small 
adjustments in the offer price as expected, and a negative relationship between venture 
capitalist ownership and price adjustment was found supporting the venture capitalist 
certification theory. It can be concluded that the adjustments in the offer price from the range 
midpoint are related to the uncertainty regarding the IPO value, and firm and offering specific 
characteristics predict to some extent the price adjustments.
6.3 Implications of the findings
Practical implications of the findings can be scrutinised from investors’ point of view. A wide 
offer price range does not provide information about the uncertainty relating to the firm’s 
value. The midpoint of the range is a relatively accurate indication of the market price of the 
issue. The underwriters do not seem to adjust the final offer price on the basis of the latest
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market conditions, but no evidence of higher initial returns to investors resulting from it was 
found.
Even though the indicative offer price range is not binding, it is seldom exceeded in Finnish 
initial public offerings, and a relatively large share of IPOs is priced at the higher limit of the 
range. It seems that underwriters commit to some extent to setting the final offer price within 
the initial offer price range. In case of IPOs with much higher demand than expected, the 
tendency to set the price within the range can provide the investors with an opportunity to 
higher initial returns.
For management and arrangers the results imply that setting the initial offer price range is a 
very important stage of the IPO pricing, as the final offer price usually remains within the 
range. A wider range gives more flexibility in pricing, but too wide a range could result in 
losing credibility in investors’ eyes.
The main implication of this study for future research is that initial offer price range has 
significance in the IPO pricing and that investigating offer price range may bring new views 
to the IPO pricing related research. The level of the range has to be set at an appropriate level, 
as large adjustments in the offer price from the range midpoint lead to more severe 
underpricing. As in many countries underwriters seem to be reluctant to exceed the limits of 
the range, the width of the offer price range is also important, especially if the demand for the 
offering turns out to be significantly higher than expected.
6.4 Suggestions for future research
This study has identified some factors that determine the level and the width of the offer price 
range, but the question of the determinants of the offer price range still remains partly 
unanswered. Especially the width of the offer price range in IPO markets without a standard 
range width provides a challenge for future research. Extending the analysis to several 
European countries and analysing the results in the light of the institutional setting of each 
country could provide some answers to the question.
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One interesting aspect to the initial offer price range that I have excluded from this study is 
the amendments in the initial offer price range. Bradley and Jordan (2002) analysed the 
relation between the range amendments and underpricing. It could be interesting to study the 
reasons for and the implications of the range amendments more in detail.
A more comprehensive use of agency theories could also provide an alternative approach to 
studying the IPO pricing. Conflicting interests of shareholders, management, underwriters, 
and investors may play a role also when it comes to the offer price range. It could be worth 
analysing more thoroughly what the interests of different parties regarding the width or the 
level of the range are. Analysis of who benefits from a wide/narrow offer price range and 
from low/high level of range may open the door for new ideas explaining the offer price 
range.
The hypothesis of firm and offering specific factors affecting the width of the range should 
not be fully rejected. There are several other firm and offerings specific factors that could 
have impact on the range, such as financial variables (leverage, level of R&D spending etc.) 
and additional factors relating to the offering (timing, purpose of raising capital).
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